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Guantanamo Bay is commonly referred to as a ‘legal black hole’ where the United States 
violated the international prohibitions of torture in the years following the 9/11 attacks. The Bush 
administration justified these violations through its creation of the ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ 
category and other legal tactics. This justification through legal means and an evasion of 
international law has been defined in academia as a form of ‘lawfare’, which refers to the use of 
law, international and domestic, as a tool that seeks to permit prohibited acts. While many 
analyses examine statements made by Bush administration officials, the infamous ‘torture 
memos’ and US legislation, this essay examines the US’ dialogue with the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture through an analysis of reports submitted by, and to, the Bush and 
Obama administrations. This essay allows for an additional perspective on how the US, which 
has committed to torture prevention through ratifying anti-torture conventions, engaged in 
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      Human rights are central to the function of key international organizations such as the United 
Nations (UN), as evidenced through the various conventions and treaty bodies which are in 
existence today. Conventions serve to bind states to respect international human rights standards 
through principles and articles which are approved and ratified (Mingst, Karns, & Lyon, 2017, p. 
246). The 1987 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT) is one such way in which UN member states seek to bind contracting 
parties to respect principles prohibiting the use of torture and acts of ill-treatment. However, the 
United States, which has ratified the CAT has been criticized by human rights lawyers, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and even the Committee Against Torture (CAT 
Committee) for its actions surrounding the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba. Upon 
declaring a ‘global War on Terror’ following the September 11, 2001 attacks on US soil, the US 
administration under President George W. Bush transferred and detained suspected terrorists at 
Guantanamo Bay. In the years following, the Bush Administration faced criticisms on the 
grounds that detainees faced indefinite detention, lacked access to justice, and in certain cases 
were tortured. The Bush administration sought to justify its actions through the creation of the 
legal category of ‘unlawful enemy combatant’, which applied to detainees held in Guantanamo. 
According to Bush administration officials, these unlawful combatants had no rights under the 
1949 Geneva Conventions (which protect prisoners of war (POW)), and the CAT did not apply 
to them. The CAT Committee has identified these determinations by the Bush administration as 
contravening human rights standards, specifically articles in the CAT prohibiting the use of 
torture. Following his election in 2008, Barack Obama was quick to condemn the actions of the 
Bush administration and showed this with his immediate executive orders to close Guantanamo 
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Bay. However, President Obama was not immune from criticism by the CAT Committee, as he 
continued some of Bush’s policies and failed to close the detention facility despite his executive 
orders.  
      This essay will examine the concept of ‘lawfare’ in order to apply it to both administrations’ 
actions surrounding Guantanamo Bay. Many scholars refer to lawfare as the use of legal tools to 
gain a military advantage or to extend the tools of war through the use of the law. This essay will 
argue that the Bush administration, through its manipulation of the CAT and Geneva 
Conventions, engaged in lawfare to justify its contravention of these same international legal 
instruments at Guantanamo Bay. This concept allows for an additional examination of how the 
infamous torture practices were justified by the Bush administration and also how the US, a 
global hegemon, sought to do this through using international and domestic law as a tool of 
navigation around its obligations. Although the Obama administration was not as blatant in 
justifying its actions and by extension rejecting international law, this essay will also examine 
how the Obama era was marked by ‘inactions’, such as the failure to prosecute high level 
officials involved in torture practices, which too contravened its international obligations under 
the CAT. Through the Bush administration’s use of lawfare, these obligations were not only put 
into question, but its justifications of practices that the CAT Committee criticized, put it in a 
‘state of exception’.
1
 Informed by the concept of lawfare, an analysis of the dialogue which 
emerged between the CAT Committee and the US in the form of reports submitted by and to 
both administrations allows for a further examination of the US’s torture record at Guantanamo 
Bay.  
                                                 
1 Lellio and Castano (2015) describe the US’ actions as “‘at the limit between politics and the law’” or as a “‘state 
of exception’”. It is through this claim of ‘exception’ that the US government attempts to make a case for the 
necessity and legality of torture programmes (p. 1283). 
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      This essay will begin by examining the commitment that the US has to international law 
regarding the prohibition of torture and how this was affected by both administrations’ 
approaches to detention practices at Guantanamo Bay. This will be followed by a review of 
literature which will examine the two dimensions of lawfare that this essay focuses on, i.e. ‘anti-
war’ lawfare and ‘pro-war’ lawfare. A third section will comprise of an analysis of the dialogue 
between the CAT Committee and the US over the course of the Bush and Obama presidencies. A 
fourth section will discuss the points of comparison that appear throughout the thesis which will 
conclude with the argument that the Bush administration engaged in pro-war lawfare, while the 




      A contextual analysis of the governing international law relevant to this thesis will be done. 
This will comprise of the main obligations set out in the CAT and Geneva Conventions, followed 
by an analysis of the US’ commitment to these obligations. Major events which occurred during 
the Bush and Obama administrations will then be analyzed in the context of Guantanamo Bay 
and the human rights violations surrounding torture. The review of literature will take the form 
of an examination of the concept of lawfare, in particular, its various uses by and against both 
administrations. It is worthy to note that much of the analysis focuses on the Bush 
administration’s use of lawfare. This is so, because President Bush was in office at the time of 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, after which what his administration called the “global War on 
Terror” began (Oakes et al., 2016, p. 938). Had President Obama been in office at the time, the 
analysis would likely focus more on his tenure. The particular focus brought to the Bush 
administration, especially in the analysis of lawfare, is not to discount the Obama 
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administration’s actions in office, but is simply due to the time in which these events occurred 
and how the Bush administration dealt with them. Upon developing the theoretical framework 
for the concept of lawfare, a total of six documents will be analyzed. This consists of the 
‘dialogue’ between the US and CAT Committee which occurred during the reporting processes 
of the Bush and Obama administrations. These documents are: the 2005 2nd Periodic report of 
the US to the CAT Committee, the 2006 Concluding Observations of the CAT Committee, the 
2007 follow-up report by the US to the CAT Committee’s recommendations (all completed 
during the Bush administration); the 2013 3rd to 5th reports of the US to the CAT Committee, the 
2014 Concluding observations of the CAT Committee and the 2015 follow-up report by the US 
to the CAT Committee’s recommendations on the combined reports (all completed during the 
Obama administration). As will be seen in the review of literature, many analyses of the Bush 
and Obama eras with regards to lawfare and Guantanamo Bay use statements made by 
government officials, domestic legislation, government documents etc. as primary sources of 
data. However, along with the use of these sources, the following analysis uses state reports and 
responses by the Committee Against Torture. In this case, the CAT represents international 
obligations to prohibit torture under international law and by extension, the CAT Committee 
represents the ‘voice’ of this international law. Therefore, this analysis is useful both 
theoretically, through the incorporation of the concept of lawfare and empirically, through an 
examination of the responses from the treaty body which upholds international law on torture. 
This examination of the ‘dialogue’ between the US and the CAT Committee through its 
theoretical and empirical contributions, adds to the existing analyses of the Bush and Obama eras 
as they pertain to human rights violations in the form of torture. The following section shall 
examine the torture prevention obligations present in international law and how the US has 
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committed to these obligations, a brief background on Guantanamo Bay and how both 
administrations conducted the affairs surrounding this detention centre.  
 
 
I.  Background 
A. Obligations to prohibit and combat torture under international law 
 
 
      The CAT Committee, a treaty body under the UN Human Rights Council, monitors the 
implementation of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT).
2
 Adopted in 1984, the CAT is an international legal instrument 
which contains 33 articles and serves as an inter-state agreement on international standards for 
the prohibition of torture.
3
 The CAT Committee monitors the implementation of the CAT by 
State parties through examining submitted state reports, and establishing mechanisms which 
involve considering individual complaints, undertaking inquires and considering inter-state 
complaints.
4
 The CAT Committee itself was established pursuant to Article 17 and began to 
function in 1988 with 10 experts who are elected by State Parties for four year terms (UNHCR, 
Fact Sheet #17)
5
. The CAT came into force in 1987 and as of today, 163 State Parties have 
                                                 
2
 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNHCR). Committee Against Torture. 
Retrieved from  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/CATIntro.aspx (accessed on March 20, 2018). 
3
 Ibid, (accessed on March 20, 2018). 
4
 Ibid.  
5
 UNHCR. Fact Sheet No. 17, The Committee Against Torture. Retrieved from 





 Clark (2013) contends that “procedurally, ratification opens a state to 
further scrutiny by the official CAT Committee established to monitor each treaty” (p. 127). This 
contention is embodied in requirements for state parties under the CAT to submit an initial 
report, regular periodic reports and to have a representative of the country respond to questions 
and concerns before the treaty body (Clark, 2013, p. 127). Added to the requirements under the 
CAT are the CAT Committee’s issuance of “concluding observations” in response to each 
government’s report which follows a follow-up report by these governments in response to the 
CAT Committee’s observations (Clark, 2013, 127). The regular periodic reports by the US and 
‘concluding observations’ by the CAT Committee will be documents examined in this essay. It is 
worthy to note that the structure of the CAT Committee’s concluding observations is done 
according to the Articles in the CAT. In other words, each of the CAT Committee’s 
recommendations are made according to the obligations set out in its governing document i.e. the 
CAT; and states’ human rights records (specifically with regards to torture) are ‘evaluated’ 
according to this. Looking beyond formalities, the entire reporting process is meant to 
demonstrate how important states’ commitments to the CAT are and how it should be upheld 
through the CAT Committee’s thorough examination of its human rights records.  
      For the purpose of this analysis, specific articles in the CAT, the 1949 Third Geneva 
Convention and Common Article 3 will be used. These documents also contain international 
legal prohibitions on torture and are referred to in the reports that will be examined. The specific 
articles that will be taken into consideration for this analysis are those that comprise Part I of the 
CAT, which are Articles 1 through 16. The analysis is not limited to just this section of the 
                                                 
6
 UNHCR Website, Status of Ratification Dashboard. Retrieved from http://indicators.ohchr.org  (accessed on 
March 20, 2018). 
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Convention, but the articles contained therein will figure prominently in the analysis of the US’ 
international obligations to the CAT. The relevant articles of the CAT can be summarized as 
follows. Article 1 provides a definition of torture and explicitly defines it as “any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him... a confession, punishing him for an act he...has 
committed”. Article 2 makes it clear that countries must take all measures to prevent torture 
within the various arms of government and that a state of war, threat of war or order from a 
superior does not constitute a justification for torture. Articles 3 and 4 respectively state that a 
state should not extradite anyone to a place where they are likely to be tortured; and that all acts 
of torture should be enshrined in a state’s criminal law. Article 5 states that Article 4 and by 
extension, the domestic laws (and accompanying penalties for the attempt to and practice of 
torture) should apply to the state’s nationals as well as extend to any territory under the State’s 
jurisdiction. Articles 10 and 11 speak to personnel involved in detention practices; they state that 
education and training on the prohibition of torture should be done, which should be included in 
the instructions concerning the duties and functions of the personnel. Articles 12 through 16 
speak to proper and impartial investigations by competent authorities and individuals’ right to 
complain to and have their case impartially examined by authorities under protection from 
intimidation. More importantly, Article 15 states that any statement established as a result of 
torture cannot be invoked as evidence in proceedings, with the exception that such a statement 
can only be used against the accused as evidence that the statement was made.  
      With 143 articles, the Third Geneva Convention, which replaced the 1929 Prisoner of War 
Convention, establishes the principle that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated 
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without delay when active hostilities end.
7
 Along with the First and Second Geneva 
Conventions, the Third Convention prohibits the use of torture of individuals detained in both 
international conflict and conflict of a non-international nature (Sikkink, 2013, p. 147). Conflict 
that takes the form of the latter is covered in Common Article 3, which is essentially a condensed 
format of the Geneva Conventions. Specifically, it requires humane treatment for all persons in 




B. US Commitment to international law and Guantanamo Bay  
 
      Although the United States has ratified fewer human rights treaties than other comparable 
treaties, it ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1955
9
 and the CAT in 1994 (Sikkink, 2013, 
p. 147). More importantly, these conventions impose international legal obligations to never use 
torture and inhumane and degrading treatment under any circumstances (Sikkink, 2013, p. 147). 
Sikkink (2013) argues that the US was deeply involved in the drafting of these treaties and 
worked to make the prohibition of torture and cruel and degrading treatment more precise and 
enforceable (p. 147). This was done specifically in the CAT as the US delegation made sure the 
treaty’s precision supported provisions on universal jurisdiction with regards to torture (Sikkink, 
                                                 
7
 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (2010). The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols. Retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-
conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm (accessed February 22, 2018).  
8
 ICRC (2010). The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols. Retrieved from 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-
conventions.htm  (accessed February 22, 2018).  
9 ICRC. Treaties and Documents by State. Retrieved from 
 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=US 
(accessed March 4, 2018). 
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2013, p. 147). Moreover, the Geneva Conventions were implemented in US domestic legislation 
in 1966 when the War Crimes Act was passed by overwhelming majorities in Congress (Sikkink, 
2013, p. 147). This Act made it a criminal offence to commit grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, including torture and cruel and degrading treatment (Sikkink, 2013, p. 147). 
Sikkink (2013), however argues that the motive behind implementing the Geneva Conventions in 
domestic law was to allow the US to prosecute war criminals, especially those from North 
Vietnam, who had tortured US soldiers during the Vietnam War (p. 147). Added to the fora of 
US implementation of international standards to domestic law, was the enactment of a new 
federal anti-torture statute after the CAT was ratified (Sikkink, 2013, p. 147). In this law, torture 
was made a felony and provided for criminal prosecution of alleged torturers in federal courts in 
specified circumstances, as well as incarceration or even the death penalty if the torture resulted 
in the victim’s death (Sikkink, 2013, p. 147).  
     Guantanamo Bay is located in Eastern Cuba and has been used by the US as a naval base 
since 1898 following the Spanish-American War (Oakes et al., 2016, p. 942). The Cuban 
American Treaty of 1903 gave the US perpetual control over the base (Oakes et al., 2016, p. 
942). In exchange for approximately $4000 a year, the land could be kept under US control until 
an agreement was made to end it (Oakes et al., 2016, p. 942). Despite Cuban objections during 
Fidel Castro’s rule, the base remained but became less valuable after the end of the Cold War 
(Oakes et al., 2016, p. 942). In 1991, approximately 34, 000 Haitian refugees were sent to 
Guantanamo Bay after they fled a military coup which ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti’s 
first democratically elected president.
10
 Cubans fleeing Castro’s rule, who were rescued by the 
                                                 
10
 CNN Library (2018, February 1), Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Fast Facts. CNN. Retrieved from 






 joined the Haitians in 1994. By 1995, the Haitian refugees returned home and 
Cubans were processed and allowed to emigrate to the US under the Clinton administration.
12
 
However, following the September 11, 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda terrorists under the leadership 
of Osama bin Laden, the centre was used to house “enemy combatants” captured by US troops in 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s Islamic fundamentalist movement, the Taliban, which ruled until 
ousted by a US-led, and UN sanctioned, military intervention in 2001, was suspected of 
harbouring persons involved in the 9/11 attacks (Guild, 2009, p. 37). When the Taliban refused 
to turn over bin Laden, this led to airstrikes launched against Al Qaeda and Taliban targets in 
Afghanistan. The US military campaign in Afghanistan was just the mere beginning of what the 
Bush administration termed, “the global War on Terror” (Oakes et al., 2016, p. 938). Suspected 
Al Qaeda/ Taliban members and supporters
13
 were captured and sent to Guantanamo Bay in 
2002 in an effort to hold them for an indeterminate period, without charge or trial (Guild, 2009, 
p. 37). The Bush administration needed to hold captured Taliban fighters and other “enemy 
combatants” in the words of then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in “‘the least worst 
place’” (Oakes et al. 2016, p. 942). However, during the Iraq war which began in 2003, the 
                                                 
11
 Santiago, F. (2014, August 18), 20 years ago, 35,000 balseros fled Castro's Cuba on anything that would float. 
Tampa Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.tampabay.com/news/humaninterest/20-years-ago-35000-balseros-
fled-castros-cuba-on-anything-that-would-float/2193473 (accessed March 21, 2018). 
12
 Ibid; Approximately 35 000 persons were interdicted at sea and ferried to Guantanamo Bay following a large 
search and rescue operation undertaken by the US Coast Guard. These persons were nicknamed balseros because of 
the homemade rafts and boats that they used. On May 2, 1995, the Clinton administration announced that most of 
the detainees would be processed and allowed to emigrate. To curtail high-seas departures, a deal was made with the 
Cuban government which entailed the issuing of 20, 000 visas a year to Cuba.  
13
 Guild notes that there exist some discrepancies in how individuals ended up at Guantanamo Bay. These 
discrepancies entail contradictions in US accounts and accounts of those who have been released from the facility. 
This includes accounts that foreigners in Afghanistan and Pakistan were picked off the streets by criminal gangs and 
‘sold’ to the US authorities for substantial sums of money on the basis that the individuals were ‘Taliban’ (Guild, 
2009, p. 37).  
  
 14 
international community was shocked at the revelation of images and leaked ‘torture 
memorandums’ (torture memos) which detailed prisoner abuse by the US army and Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) at detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq.  
      Throughout the operations of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, the United States 
committed human rights violations against suspected terrorists. “Enhanced interrogation 
techniques” which included waterboarding and slamming prisoners against walls have been 
identified by NGOs and other critics, but more importantly, by the CAT Committee. This human 
rights treaty body has called for the closing of the detention facility in its reports and has 
expressed its concerns over the violations which have occurred there.  
 
C. The Bush administration  
 
      Oakes et al. (2016) argue that Bush’s presidency was ultimately defined by the 9/11 crisis 
and shaped America in the first decade of the twenty-first century (p. 937). Not only was the 
international community shocked at images of abuse at detention facilities, but there was also 
widespread outrage at the actions of the Bush administration regarding the torture of detainees in 
the immediate post 9/11 era. Some academics argue that the Bush administration attempted to 
legitimize the practice of torture during the interrogation of detainees as well as justify the 
practice of detention without trial (Lellio and Castano, 2015, p. 1279). These attempts by the 
Bush administration are captured in the creation of the legal category of unlawful enemy 
combatant. This category was applicable to members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban detained by 
the US. The category had the intent of making detainees appear to be outside of the law (Lellio 
and Castano, 2015, p. 1279). At a Department of Defense media briefing on 11 January 2002, the 
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same month that the first prisoners arrived at Guantanamo Bay, Rumsfeld stated that persons 
held there would not be viewed in legal terms as prisoners of war, but as “‘unlawful 
combatants’” and as such they, “do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention[s]” (Guild, 
2009, p. 37). Along with the classification of unlawful enemy combatants, ‘enhanced 
interrogation techniques’ were used on prisoners. Such techniques were adopted by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), which included, but were not limited to slamming a detainee’s head 
against the wall, sleep deprivation and water boarding. For a time, the base provided the Bush 
administration with the freedom to apply these techniques, performed by CIA agents, FBI and 
military interrogators. Some authors maintain that these techniques copied Chinese Communist 
methods from the 1950s (Oakes et al., 2016, p. 942). However, because individuals were 
categorized as unlawful enemy combatants, the Bush administration deemed these enhanced 
interrogation techniques (by which some prisoners were tortured) as permissible (Lellio and 
Castano, 2015, p. 1280). This clear violation of the CAT and US domestic law was done through 
the administration’s use of legislative loopholes, which some scholars argue can be defined as a 
form of “lawfare”. This concept, according to Finkelstein (2017), captures how certain states 
have made “use of law to accomplish military aims” (p. 383). Following on this, Richter-
Montpetit (2014) highlights how the concept gained popularity after it was used in a widely cited 
article by Major General Charles Dunlap Jr., a former US Deputy Judge Advocate General. 
Dunlap defined lawfare as “‘strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional 
military means to achieve an operational objective’”. (p. 48) As will be examined in greater 
detail in subsequent sections of this essay, lawfare essentially has a double usage in academic 
scholarship. The first way in which lawfare is used falls within what is identified in this essay as 
an ‘anti-war’ stance. This first usage reflects the manner in which lawyers and NGOs have 
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sought to use international and domestic law to constrain US military power. Through this anti-
war stance and in opposition to US human rights violations, lawyers, NGOs and even scholars 
may use the law and courts to achieve the objective of bringing the US to justice. The second 
usage identified in this thesis is referred to as ‘pro-war’ lawfare. This second usage reflects how 
the US engaged in the manipulation of international legal instruments (such as the Third Geneva 
and the CAT) to justify the use of torture on a legal basis. This second usage of lawfare is the 
focus of this research with regards to the Bush administration and its application to the Obama 
administration. It can be argued that the Bush administration engaged in lawfare against 
international human rights standards enshrined in the CAT and Geneva Conventions through 
torture memos and the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Several legal torture memos were 
requested by the CIA to protect the administration from potential war crimes prosecution. The 
torture memos rejected the application of the Geneva Conventions to detainees and justified 
aggressive interrogation techniques used by the CIA. The Bush administration further engaged in 
lawfare by using the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Luban (2008) uses the “Lawfare 
hypothesis” and the “Torture Cover-up hypothesis” to explain how the US has evaded the rule of 
law and challenged the lawyers representing detainees at Guantanamo Bay through the use of 
military commissions enshrined in the Act. Luban (2008) argues that although the Act forbade 
the admission of evidence obtained under torture, it “finesses this difficulty in various ways” (p. 
2022). For Luban (2008), according to the Act, coerced evidence could be admitted if it was 
reliable and there was a dispute about the level of coercion. In other words, if during the trial the 
defendant claims the evidence was obtained through torture and the government disputes that the 
techniques were torture, then the evidence could be admitted regardless of the defendant’s claims 
(p. 2022).  The Act also gave prosecutors the ability to prevent defense inquiries into sources and 
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methods by which evidence was obtained (Luban, 2008, pp. 2022-2023). Furthermore, the rules 
of the Act permitted hearsay which allowed an interrogator to testify about what a witness said 
without describing the conditions or threats that occurred. However, Luban (2008) argues that 
“the issue at Guantanamo may not be lawfare alone; it may also be covering up torture.” (p. 
2023). Therefore, through creating difficulties for defense lawyers, lawfare made plea bargains 
the only viable option for detainees (Luban, 2008, p. 196).  
 
“Habeas corpus” is another term that appears frequently in the literature and the reports. It 
refers to a writ which allows federal courts to determine the validity of an individual’s detention 
held by the US. Specifically, it allows for judicial access to US domestic courts to contest an 
individual’s holding in Guantanamo Bay. During Bush’s presidency, under the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, it was held that prisoners at 
Guantanamo Bay could not access the federal courts using habeas corpus, but had to go through 
the military commissions and then appeal in the D.C. Circuit Court. However, in Rasul vs. Bush 
(2004), the Supreme Court held that detainees, who were classified as ‘enemy combatants’ had 
the constitutional right to habeas corpus. In other words, detainees were given access to US civil 
courts for their cases to be tried, something that prisoners were not able to do before. The 
following subsection shall examine the Obama administration’s actions regarding Guantanamo 
Bay.  
 
D. The Obama administration 
 
      The Obama administration moved away from Bush’s harsh 9/11 policies, but Yin (2011) 
argues that Obama made further mistakes, due to an overreaction to his predecessor’s policies (p. 
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455). In his second full day in office, President Obama issued three Executive orders concerning 
lawful interrogations, Guantanamo Bay and detention policy options (State Dpt., 2013, p. 10). 
With these orders, he instructed the CIA to close down any detention facilities that it operated. 
At the time of writing, Guantanamo Bay still remains open
14
 and this inability to close the 
detention facilities remains one of the main criticisms of the Obama administration. However, 
there are various points of comparison regarding both administrations’ actions and inactions. Yin 
(2011) states that both Bush and Obama learned from Bush’s ‘first-term-mistake’ of not having a 
formal process to capture fighters and transfer them to Guantanamo Bay or leave them in 
Afghanistan. The Bush administration introduced Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) 
and Administrative Review Hearings (ARHs) (explained further in this essay) to fix the 
“mistake” he made of not having a formal process to determine combatant status of Guantanamo 
Bay detainees. Both Obama and Bush learned from this mistake as seen in the reduction of the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees throughout their presidencies and Obama specifically learned by 
employing a Special Task force to evaluate detainees’ status (Yin, 2011, p. 462-463). Lellio and 
Castano (2015) critique the Obama administration for failing to prosecute officials who approved 
or practiced torture in 2008 (p. 1283). Forsythe (2011) argues that although the Obama 
administration declared that Bush’s legal memos were ‘null and void’, called for the closing of 
Guantanamo Bay through his executive orders, and forbade most of the enhanced interrogation 
                                                 
14
 In fact, and also in striking contrast to Obama’s executive order to close Guantanamo Bay, President Trump 
signed an executive order to keep Guantanamo Bay open. The order instructs the defense secretary, James Mattis, to 
deliver a new policy on battlefield detentions, “including policies governing transfer of individuals to US Naval 
Station Guantanamo Bay”. In his State of the Union address on January 30, 2018, Trump said that the move to close 
Guantanamo Bay reflected softness in the fight against terrorism. In reviving the Bush administration’s infamous 
legal category, Trump stated that, “terrorists are not merely criminals. They are unlawful enemy combatants. And 
when captured overseas, they should be treated like the terrorists they are.” Borger, J. (2018, January 31), Donald 
Trump signs executive order to keep Guantánamo Bay open. The Guardian Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/30/guantanamo-bay-trump-signs-executive-order-to-keep-prison-
open (accessed March 22, 2017). 
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methods, he shared some continuity with Bush’s policies (p. 781). This included echoing the 
Bush administration’s argument that the US was at war with Al Qaeda and using “executive 
justifications for detention” (Forsythe, 2011, p. 781). Forsythe (2011) asserts that although he 
gave “new life” to military commissions
15
, Obama used them to try some prisoners and 
continued to use “administrative detention without legal charge or trial for others” (p. 781-782). 
Forsythe (2011), however notes that Obama faced intense criticism for many of his 
counterterrorism policies, especially those related to the treatment of terror suspects, specifically 
from former Vice President Cheney and his supporters (p. 782). This criticism was voiced when 
Congress blocked Obama’s efforts in 2009 to close Guantanamo Bay and upgrade a detention 
facility in Illinois to accept the transfer of some detainees (Forsythe, 2011, p. 782). The Obama 
administration faced further difficulties in 2010 when proposals arose to try Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed (KSM), the supposed mastermind of 9/11 in a federal court. This included restrictive 
legislation and the alteration of the prosecutions plans for KSM, who had been tortured 
(Forsythe, 2011, p. 782). Bush also faced similar criticism on the issue of trying KSM and other 
high level Al Qaeda suspects in federal courts, but Yin (2011) argues that on this issue, Obama 
made a new mistake- the inability to initiate the criminal prosecution of KSM, because of the 
criticisms that Bush faced (p. 472-473). Yin (2011) states that Obama did not completely 
renounce the use of military commissions, but “agreed that some cases are appropriately 
prosecuted in the military system” (p. 471).  Another main criticism of Obama is his 
administration’s failure to prosecute persons who approved or practiced enhanced interrogation 
methods on abusers (Lellio and Castano, 2015, p. 1283). Lellio and Castano (2015) argue that 
                                                 
15
 As will be discussed in the section on the analysis of reports, President Obama replaced the 2006 Military 
Commissions Act with 2009 Military Commissions Act, giving prisoners better access to the courts.  
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this contravenes the US’ obligations to the CAT and “the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, as well as the Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights, have demanded 
accountability for such egregious violations” (p. 1283).  
      Given the context of the obligations under the CAT and the Geneva Conventions and an 
overview of what occurred during both administrations, the following section will examine the 
literature surrounding the concept of lawfare in order to provide a theoretical framework to 
evaluate the actions of both administrations.  
 
II. Literature review: Lawfare as ‘pro-war’ and ‘anti-war’  
       This section serves as an examination of how lawfare has been used by various scholars. 
Upon revision of the literature, two dimensions of lawfare have been identified, which will be 
used in this analysis. These two dimensions are: ‘pro-war’ and ‘anti-war’. The term ‘pro-war’ 
will be used to describe the use of international law as a tool of manipulation by governments (in 
this case, the US government). Lawfare, in this sense, is meant to capture how law, international 
and domestic, can be used as a tool of war where prohibited acts are rendered permissible. On 
the other hand, defining lawfare through the lens of ‘anti-war’ will be used to describe how 
international and domestic law can serve as a mechanism to constrain state behavior in the 
conduct of warfare. This second dimension of lawfare is engaged in by actors such as NGOs and 
human rights lawyers and reflects how the tradition of international humanitarian law, of which 
the Geneva Conventions is a component, has sought to limit what is permissible during war.  
 
Much of the literature surrounding the US’ human rights record with regards to 
Guantanamo Bay speaks to the pro-war aspect of lawfare, i.e. the Bush administration’s 
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engagement in lawfare as a means to legitimize and justify certain policies or actions. This essay 
seeks to focus on this pro-war dimension, where the Bush administration engaged in lawfare to 
justify the human rights violations that occurred at Guantanamo Bay. However, the anti-war 
aspect will also be examined to complete the theoretical basis of this essay. This review of 
literature will reveal the multifaceted and nuanced nature of the pro-war dimension of lawfare 
because of the way in which the Bush administration engaged in it. This is so, as while lawfare is 
described as the use of law to gain an advantage, added to this, the Bush administration sought to 
negate international law by rendering the CAT and Geneva Conventions inapplicable to 
Guantanamo detainees. The analysis of documents, which follows this section will provide 
linkages to the literature review and further confirm this nuanced nature of the concept of 
lawfare by examining how the CAT Committee responded to the Bush administration’s pro-war 
stance.  
      Megret (2006) provides a striking analysis of the literature surrounding the US and its 
commitment to international anti-torture standards. He acknowledges that dominant discourse 
may condemn the Bush administration’s actions with regard to captured detainees. However, he 
contradicts the dominant discourse by arguing that ‘exclusion’ of the ‘the other’ may be built 
into the very constitution of the laws of war and international humanitarian law (Megret, 2006, p. 
2). In other words, the legal “justifications” that many scholars argue have been given by Bush 
administration officials may have been embedded into the laws of war such as the Geneva 
Conventions. Megret (2006) contends that even before the creation of international humanitarian 
law, history has shown that from the late 1800s and early 1900s, the exclusion of non-European 
peoples was embedded in the design of the very beginnings of the laws of war in Europe. He 
traces this exclusion back the historical roots of the laws of war themselves and emphasizes that 
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international humanitarian law has a racist and colonial past that is present in its contemporary 
usage, specifically in fighting the War on Terrorism (Megret, 2006, p. 4). Megret (2006) notes 
that the same year (1876) that the International Committee for the Relief of Military Wounded 
took the name by which it is known now, i.e., as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
was the same year when the European colonial expansion in Africa began (Megret, 2006, p. 4). 
This was the period when “King Leopold II of Belgium, the soon to be tormentor of Congo, 
convened a conference in Brussels which began the ‘Scramble for Africa’ (Megret, 2006, p. 4). 
Megret (2006) also cites the time of the adoption of The Hague Conventions which happened to 
occur towards the end of a twenty-year period which saw Africa pass from being largely self-
governed to being mostly dominated by European powers (Megret, 2006, p. 4). Megret (2006) 
states that “the exclusion of non-European peoples from the laws of war was a direct function of 
the adoption by the nascent ‘international community’...with its emphasis on the state as the sole 
source of law” (p. 14). As a result of the state being regarded as what Megret refers to as the 
“methodological and substantive framework of international law”, the laws of war were 
considered to apply only between states and to the extent that states were party to them (Megret, 
2006, p. 14). Thus, Megret (2006) states that “there would be little scope for applying the laws of 
war (or any international law)” to those that European parties were fighting, who were not parties 
to the relevant instruments. (p. 14). This is where the theme of ‘civilized’ and ‘non-civilized’ 
arise where specifically, civilization is associated with the laws of war and not to ‘non-civilized’ 
peoples (Megret, 2006, p. 16). Upon decolonization, Third World states ratified the Geneva 
Conventions and could therefore obtain protection during conflicts (Megret, 2006, p. 22).  
      Megret (2006) uses the arguments of Bush administration officials on the applicability (or 
rather inapplicability) of the laws of war to Al Qaeda and Taliban members to examine how the 
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exclusion of the “uncivilized” or “savages” has resurfaced (p. 24). Megret (2006) examines the 
2002 Bybee memorandum, remarks by the then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John Yoo
16
 
and others to make this argument (p. 24). Megret (2006) argues that both Bybee and Yoo, in their 
claims that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Al Qaeda, because it is not a nation state 
and has not signed on to the Conventions, resembled the conventional argument that savage 
tribes or the uncivilized were not party to relevant treaties (Megret, 2006, p. 24). Adding to this 
claim, John Yoo stated that “‘even if Al Qaeda were a nation-state and a party to the Geneva 
Conventions, its members would still qualify as illegal belligerents due to their very conduct’” 
(Megret, 2006, p. 25). This “conduct”, according to Yoo suggests that illegal combatants had no 
intention of respecting the laws of war because they violate the core tenets of these laws (Megret, 
2006, p. 25). Furthermore, Yoo’s reasoning, which bares similarity to the case of non-civilized 
peoples follows that unlawful combatants cannot benefit from the laws of war because they 
cannot possibly be expected to reciprocate (Megret, 2006, p. 25).  
In Yoo’s words: 
The primary enforcer of the laws of war has been reciprocal treatment: We obey the 
Geneva Conventions because our opponent does the same with American POWs. That is 
impossible with Al Qaeda. It has never demonstrated any desire to prove humane 
treatment to captured Americans. .... [a] treaty like the Geneva Convention makes perfect 
sense when it binds genuine nations that can reciprocate humane treatment of prisoners. 
                                                 
16
 This memorandum, dated January 22, 2002 and entitled ‘Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and 
Taliban Detainees’ was one of the ‘torture memos’ signed by then Assistant Attorney General, Jay Bybee and 
submitted to Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense (Megret, 2006, p. 24). The main argument in this memo was that the Geneva Conventions 
did not apply to suspected Al Qaeda terrorists.  
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... but the Geneva Convention makes little sense when applied to a terrorist group or a 
pseudo-state (Megret, 2006, p. 25).  
Megret (2006) states that the Bush administration’s “resuscitation” of the historical exclusion of 
the ‘other’ leads to the dominant response of condemnation of his policies, which is evidenced 
by many scholars, especially in this thesis (p. 26). He admits that there are some elements in the 
US’ policies which are highly questionable, such as Yoo’s emphasis on the role of reciprocity
17 
(Megret, 2006, p. 26). However, Megret (2006) argues that “humanitarian lawyers
18
 often fail to 
acknowledge as readily as they should that there is a strong legal case that the Geneva 
Conventions would simply not grant POW status to many of those caught in Afghanistan” (p. 
27). He further argues that, “many humanitarian lawyers know, but loathe to concede that the 
Bush administration is often merely mimicking the law [in its claims]” (Megret, 2006, p. 27). 
Megret (2006) thus critiques these lawyers for knowing this information, but choosing to conceal 
it; and states that this withholding of knowledge is part of the “‘hidden college’ of international 
humanitarian lawyers” (p. 27). He continues that, “the US authorities’ case is not often a case to 
simply violate or do away with the law, [but rather] a characteristically strict, almost legalistic 
interpretation of the law” (Megret, 2006, 27). In other words, Megret (2006) contends that 
although actions of the Bush administration were heavily seen as violations by many, including 
lawyers, it could be argued that officials were operating within the confines of international law. 
To further support this argument, Megret (2006) states that a strong case can be made that Al 
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 Megret (2006) argues “that Yoo confuses a common factual explanation for why the laws of war are ever actually 
respected with a legal-dogmatic justification for not respecting them” (p. 26).  
18
 Humanitarian lawyers who use the law to fight US policies through anti-war lawfare.  
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Qaeda members do not fulfil the criteria of the Geneva Conventions
19
 to be considered as 
“belligerents as a militia, volunteer corps or resistance movement” (p. 27). These requirements 
include: one having to be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, to carry arms 
openly, to have a fixed recognizable emblem and to conduct their operations in accordance with 
the laws and customs of war (Megret, 2006, p. 27). Because a strong case can be made premised 
on simply what the law says and nothing else, Megret (2006) argues that the case that Al Qaeda 
members should not be entitled to prisoner of war status
20
 is hard to defeat (p. 27). Megret 
makes a striking legal argument here by simply stating that the international law governing the 
protection of individuals, such as those detained at Guantanamo Bay can support the claims of 
the Bush administration officials. However, it leaves open the question of if the torture 
committed by interrogation personnel was justified. Megret (2006) answers this question by 
stating that although a reading of the law can be argued to make several cases in favour of the 
Bush administration and against international humanitarian lawyers, what should be done with 
Al Qaeda members is a totally different issue (p. 27).  
      Megret (2013) argues that since the enactment of the Geneva Conventions and after the 
establishment of other contemporary laws of war, we can now distinguish between different 
types of combatants (p. 28). However, a blind spot remains, which presumes that we know what 
a (legal) combatant is (Megret, 2012, p. 28). He contends that the laws of war, thus determine the 
legitimate participants in warfare (as can be seen in the US’ justification of its practices through 
the creation of the classification, ‘unlawful enemy combatants’) (Megret, 2013, p. 28). He states 
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 Megret (2013) also uses the criteria of The Hague Regulations along with the Third Geneva Convention for one 
to be classified as belligerents, a militia, volunteer corps or resistance movement (p. 27).  
20
 The case made by then Bush officials, mainly Bybee, Yoo and Rumsfeld.  
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that, with the gradual codification of the laws of war, we witness a recycling of the issue of what 
the applicable rules are (for instance, whether obligations are owed on the basis of reciprocity
21
), 
into the definition of who is entitled to their benefit (for example, capacity to reciprocate as a 
condition for combatant status) (Megret, 2013, p. 28). Megret (2013) argues that “the laws of 
war can be seen as continuously excluding that which does not conform to the image they project 
of legitimate warfare” (p. 31) This, of course has roots in the historical establishment and 
evolution of the laws of war. Finally, Megret (2013) states that: 
The crumbling of the founding dichotomy between ‘civilization’ and savagery, moreover, 
can only send the laws of war stumbling down into a spiral of decomposition .... it may 
also explain why, paradoxically, the laws of war need their ‘savages’, whether they be 
war criminals, terrorists or unlawful combatants, and go through periodic ‘crises of 
otherness’ that lead them to reassert... their foundational counter-image (p. 37).  
 
      As introduced earlier, Dunlap popularized the concept of lawfare and his work is widely 
cited by many scholars. In his 2001 article,
22
 Dunlap defines lawfare as “a method of warfare 
where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective” (Dunlap, 2001, p. 4). Dunlap 
(2001) contends that with the rise of international law, which encompassed the creation of the 
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 This issue of reciprocity is based on remarks made by Yoo where he stated that “‘[a] treaty like the Geneva 
Convention makes perfect sense when it binds genuine nations that can reciprocate humane treatment of prisoners.... 
but the Geneva Convention makes little sense when applied to a terrorist group or a pseudo-state’” (Megret, 2013, p. 
25). In other words, Yoo supported the inapplicability of the Geneva Conventions (the main argument of the Bush 
administration) based on this issue of reciprocity. If Al Qaeda (which is not a nation-state) showed no desire to treat 
American prisoners humanely, then Yoo contends that the Geneva Conventions “make little sense” to be applied 
(Megret, 2014, p. 25).  
22
 The term was popularized through a paper that Dunlap prepared for the 2001 Humanitarian Challenges in 
Military Intervention Conference. Dunlap did not coin the term, but due to the time that this was published 




1949 Geneva Conventions, a principle focus was to spare non-combatants the adverse effects of 
war (p. 2). Here, the anti-war dimension arises, where Dunlap (2001) argues that through the use 
of lawfare by NGOs, there exists an element of ‘anti-Americanism’ where international law is 
used to “check American power” (p. 3). Through an anti-war stance, NGOs who see 
international law as a way to constrain states (and to protect non-combatants through the Geneva 
Conventions, for instance), engage in lawfare against the US. He further states that this may be 
the reason that criticism of US positions mark much of the debate in the international 
community. Dunlap’s arguments on this anti-war dimension of lawfare are important in 
analyzing the criticism and debate surrounding the US’ actions around Guantanamo Bay and 
dialogue with the CAT Committee. Dunlap (2001) further states that this dimension of lawfare is 
frequently used by US opponents to cynically manipulate the rule of law and humanitarian 
values it represents (p. 4). In a 2008 article, Dunlap returns with a more refined definition of 
lawfare (used earlier in this essay)
23
  where he continues his argument that the rise in 
international law is tied to globalization (Dunlap, 2008, p. 146). He also states that lawfare is like 
a tool or weapon that can be used in accordance with the virtues of the rule of law (Dunlap, 
2008, p. 148). Dunlap (2008) argues that concern from the public, NGOs, legislatures and courts 
over the behavior of militaries is not a public relations problem
24
, but rather of adherence to the 
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 In his 2001 paper, Major General Charles Dunlap, Jr, defines lawfare as the ‘strategy of using – or misusing – 
law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective’ (Richter-Montpetit, 2014, p. 
48).  
24
NGOs, courts and others with an anti-war position may have sparked public attention through their concern over 
the US government’s policies surrounding Guantanamo Bay. However, Dunlap asserts that these expressions of 
concern were more than a public relations problem (for the Bush administration), but rather “a legitimate and serious 
activity that is totally consistent with adherence to the rule of law, democratic values, and – for that matter – 
lawfare” (Dunlap, 2008, p. 148). In other words, Dunlap identifies the engagement in anti-war lawfare by NGOs, 
etc. as important and it can be argued that this signifies the further importance of international law. This engagement 
in anti-war lawfare is critical to ensuring that states like the US adhere to not only their commitments to 
international law, but to the rule of law. 
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rule of law and lawfare itself (Dunlap, p. 148). Dunlap (2008) asserts that there are both negative 
and positive forms of lawfare, and it is now a part of modern warfare (p. 149). He further goes on 
to critique Yoo’s arguments
25
 that military lawyers (JAGs) “are responsible ... for a ‘breakdown’ 
in civil-military relations” and that, “JAG legal opinions amounted to ‘policy preferences’”
 26
 
(Dunlap, 2008, p. 150). Dunlap (2008) attempts to dispel this notion by stating that the work of 
JAGs, which included opposition to harsh physical interrogation techniques and an evidentiary 
scheme
27
 for military commissions were not a ‘policy preference’, but rather insistence upon due 
process (Dunlap, 2008, p.150-151). Dunlap (2008) supports the work of JAGs throughout his 
article and stands by their role of upholding constitutional values as well as advising military 
officers and reiterates that their role is what ought to be done in the lawfare era (pp. 151-152).  
      In continuing on the concept of lawfare, Jones (2016) examines how the anti-war dimension 
gained currency after the 9/11 attacks, which prompted the ‘pro-war’ use of law reaction by the 
Bush administration (p. 227). Jones (2016) also continues Dunlap’s (2001) argument that an 
element of anti-Americanism in the use of lawfare exists to ‘check’ the US’ actions (p. 227). He 
states that “as soon as international law and ... human rights law began being deployed to check 
certain practices in the War on Terror”, the US adopted an oppositional stance (Jones, 2016, p. 
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 John Yoo and Glenn Sulmasy, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational Choice Approach to 
the War on Terror, 54 UCLA Law Review 1815 (2007). Subsequent to his tenure as a Bush administration official, 
John Yoo became a Professor at the University of California, Berkeley. The arguments that Dunlap critiques are 
contained in this article in the August issue of the UCLA Law Review.  
 
26 Yoo’s contentions are a representation of Bush administrations view of how JAGs, NGOs and others used 
lawfare i.e. against the US government through the courts. This use of lawfare can be contrasted to how Bush 
officials used the law to dismiss international instruments through their memos, military commissions and 
statements.  
27 This ‘evidentiary scheme’ that Dunlap refers to a tenet of military commissions where an accused would have 
been convicted and sentenced to death based on evidence he never saw. JAGs used lawfare to oppose this (Dunlap, 
2008, p. 150). 
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227). Jones (2016) argues that Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay “signified the ultimate abuse of 
the law, and the Torture Memos were artefacts of lawfare par excellence” (p. 227, emphasis in 
original).
28
 However, he states that US neoconservatives opposed this view of lawfare and 
argued that “‘the real abuse of law in Guantanamo Bay came not from those who conducted and 
authorized torture, but from the unlawful enemy combatants and the NGOs and lawyers who 
represented them’” (Jones, 2016, p.227). These neoconservatives believed that “the detainees 
constructed a ‘mistreatment narrative’ which they used ‘as ammunition for waging tactical 
lawfare’” (Jones, 2016, pp. 227-228). In other words, neoconservatives believed that detainees 
and their advocates in the post 9/11 context “‘launched a massive campaign through various 
court systems worldwide’”. In evaluating this use of lawfare, Jones (2018) identifies the 
“interesting...extension of the lawfare label to US lawyers in particular to the human rights 
community in general” (p. 228). Jones (2016) continues that within this extension through the 
lawfare discourse, “human rights law itself becomes indistinguishable from the enemy Other and 
must therefore be militated against” (p. 228). Jones’ (2018) work is significant to the 
understanding of the dichotomy of lawfare that exists and more importantly that the concept 
thrives within the post/911, War on Terror environment. Neoconservative views on lawfare help 
to understand the Bush administration’s stance on issues surrounding Guantanamo and how it 
deployed tools of lawfare to engage in this globalized, new era of ‘war’ through legal means.  
      Luban (2008) uses what he terms the “lawfare hypothesis” and the “torture cover-up 
hypothesis” to “provide an explanation for government efforts to take out the adversary” in its 
pro-war engagement of lawfare (p. 2021). This “adversary” includes lawyers, NGOs who 
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  Here, Jones ultimately identifies the Torture Memos as artefacts or rather, tools of lawfare. He also identifies 
‘unlawful enemy combatants’ as a term of “lawfare art”. 
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challenged the actions of the US. Luban (2008), in referring to a book published by Yoo
29
 states 
that Yoo regards his own efforts to legitimize tactics such as indefinite detention and harsh 
interrogation as a way of waging war through law
30
 (p. 2020). He continues that Yoo defends 
these controversial tactics in his book by saying that they should not be seen as problematic, but 
as “exercises of traditional war powers in a new kind of war” (p. 2020). Here, Luban (2008) 
identifies Yoo’s statements as “keeping with the concept of ‘lawfare’ by which is meant the use 
of international law and litigation as a method of gaining military advantage”
 31
 (p. 2020). In line 
with Dunlap and Jones’ arguments that anti-Americanism sentiments exist within the fora of 
lawfare, Luban (2008) states that some commentators regard the use of lawfare as an insidious 
tool of America’s enemies. He continues that these enemies include internationalist NGOs with 
an agenda to promote (Luban, 2008, p. 2020). Therefore, Luban states that the concept of lawfare 
helped to provide an explanation for government efforts to take out the adversary through their 
pro-war stance. Luban and Jones both quote the 2005 National Defense Strategy of the US to not 
only support the lawfare argument, but to show the striking way in which US officials used it. 
The 2005 National Defense Strategy, produced by the Pentagon and signed by the Secretary of 
Defense states, “‘Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who 
                                                 
29 Yoo published a memoir entitled War by Other Means which Luban also reviews in one of his earlier works – 
David Luban, The Defense of Torture, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar 15, 2007, pp. 37-40.  
30
 Before this statement, Luban quotes Prussian military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz’s, famous description of 
war as “the continuation of politics by other means”. He argues that, Yoo puts an “ingenious twist of Clausewitz” 
through his defense the legality of controversial tactics (while he worked under President Bush), (Luban, 2011, p. 
2020). 
31 
Similar to Dunlap’s analysis of Yoo’s contentions, Yoo’s statements can be seen as a legitimate representation of 
the US government’s use of lawfare.  
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employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism’”
32
 
(Luban, 2008, p. 2020). Jones and Luban admit that this “equation of judicial process with 
terrorism” is startling, but it confirms the Bush administration’s acceptance of their 
understanding of the lawfare theory (Luban, 2008, pp. 2020-2021). Also, it justifies the 
categorizing of lawyers who invoke international law, human rights or civil liberties as 
America’s enemies (Luban, 2008, pp. 2020-2021). Luban further states that the US government’s 
idea of lawfare is fundamentally a “paranoid overreaction to perfectly legitimate legal challenges 
to Guantanamo detentions” (p. 2021). In other words, the US government’s pro-war stance on 
lawfare was an overreaction to anti-war challenges by NGOs and human rights lawyers. He also 
points out that Dunlap (2008) goes to great lengths to distance his ideas from this “paranoid 
thinking” by stating that concern from those such as NGOs, lawyers etc. is a serious activity. 
However, even amidst Dunlap’s efforts to support the work of lawyers, NGOs etc., who are 
accused of being ‘anti-American”, Luban (2008) states that Dunlap is a JAG (Dunlap was a JAG 
at the time of his writing) (p. 2021). Therefore, devotees to the lawfare theory, such as neo 
conservatives may disregard Dunlap’s sentiments and use it as another example of why JAGs 
(who advise military lawyers and aid in representing detainees) “must be brought to heel” 
(Luban, 2008, p. 2021).
33
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 Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2005), The National Defense Strategy of the USA. 
Retrieved from http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2005_NDS.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-124535-143  
(accessed March 13, 2018). 
33 Luban also argues that government policies (intentionally or not) made it difficult for lawyers to provide legal 
representation for Guantanamo Bay prisoners (p. 1983). Difficulties such as limited flights to the prison itself and 




      Although in this essay, it is argued that lawfare has a double usage i.e. use by the US 
government and use by NGOs, lawyers etc., Morrissey (2011) identifies two alternative ways in 
which the US government employed lawfare in the War on Terror (p. 280). More specifically, he 
breaks down the pro-war stance into two forms. The first form that Morrissey (2011) identifies 
involves the “indefinite detention and sometimes extraordinary rendition of enemy combatants, 
legally sanctioned and politically justified by the exceptional circumstances of late modern war 
and terrorist violence” (p. 280). The second form that Morrissey (2011) identifies involves a 
legal strategy which conditions and protects the US military in ‘offensive’ mode (p. 280). In this 
second form, in order to protect itself from ‘attacks’ by NGOs, lawyers and international bodies 
like the UN, the US engaged in lawfare through legal means. Throughout his analysis, Morrissey 
focuses on this second form which he argues, “operates at the national and transnational scale 
and involves the careful legal designation and protection of US military personnel” (Morrissey, 
2011, p. 280). Morrissey defines this form of lawfare as, “‘forward juridical warfare’”, where he 
argues that the US military mobilizes the law in the waging of war along the new frontiers of its 
War on Terror.
34
 Like Luban (2008), Morrissey (2011) acknowledges Clausewitz’s observation 
that war is the “continuation of political commerce by other means” (Morrissey, 2011, p. 291). 
However, he adds to this definition by stating that, “today, the lawfare of the US military is a 
continuation of war by legal means” (Morrissey, 2011, p. 291). 
      For her part, Sikkink (2013) attempts to apply the “spiral model” to the Bush 
administration’s use of legislation to protect its personnel and justify its acts by rejecting 
international legal instruments, such as the Geneva Conventions and the CAT. Many human 
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rights researchers have used empirical evidence and methods to apply the spiral model to states 
(Simmons, 2013, p. 44). This model attempts to explain how international human rights norms 
have come to influence domestic human rights practices, essentially, from ratification to 
compliance (Simmons, 2013, pp. 43-44). Although Sikkink (2013) admits that there are ways in 
which the spiral model does not apply to the US case, she attempts to do so through applying the 
various stages of the model to how the Bush administration handled accusations of human rights 
violations (p. 163). The way in which she attempts to apply the US case to the spiral model 
contains tenets of the concept of lawfare and is therefore of worth for this thesis. For Sikkink 
(2013), states go through different phases in the spiral model, namely: repression; denial; tactical 
concessions; prescriptive status; and rule-consistent behavior (pp. 148-161).   
       As she goes through the different “phases” of the spiral model, three ways in which Sikkink 
describes the Bush administration’s use of lawfare are identified. The first surrounds the blatant 
denial of international instruments. This concurrently falls along Phase 2 of the spiral model i.e. 
“denial”. Sikkink (2013) argues that through public statements, legal memos and reports 
prepared by the Justice Department and the Defense Department, the Bush administration 
entered this process of denial. One such instance of this included the Bush administration’s 
argument that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the Afghanistan conflict and thus the 
consideration of detainees as not falling in the category of ‘prisoners of war’, which is enshrined 
in the Geneva Conventions. This is where the term “illegal enemy combatants” was coined. 
Sikkink (2013) argues that this decision by the Bush administration was problematic in terms of 
the existing laws of war and “opened the door to torture” (p. 150). As stated earlier in this essay, 
the Geneva Conventions protect any detainee from torture in non-international and international 
conflicts. However, Sikknik (2013) argues that the Bush administration’s determination that the 
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Geneva Conventions were inapplicable to the Al Qaeda conflict could be implied as the 
permission of torture (p. 150). Another part of the phase of denial included the Bush 
administration’s efforts to reinterpret the definition of torture in the Geneva Conventions and 
CAT in order to use certain interrogation techniques (Sikkink, 2013, p. 150). Sikkink (2013) 
cites the 2002 memorandum by Bybee (one of the infamous ‘torture memos’), as an example of 
the creation of a “narrow definition of torture” contrary to the CAT and US legislation which 
implements the CAT (p. 151). The memorandum suggests that “physical pain amounting to 
torture must be the equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such 
as organ failure, impairment of body function or even death” (Sikkink, 2013, p. 151). The 2002 
memorandum also states that “the infliction of such pain must be the defendant’s precise 
objective” (Sikkink, 2013, p. 151). Sikkink (2013) argues that the memo creates an “absurd and 
unstable definition” of torture where only one who “engages in a practice resulting in pain 
equivalent to death is a torturer” (p. 151). 
      Another category which stands out in Sikkink’s analysis of the Bush administration, with 
respect to the concept of lawfare, surrounds the use of legislation to protect personnel. Sikkink 
(2013) argues that Bush administration officials sought legal tools to protect the CIA and other 
state officials from prosecution for acts they understood had the risk of criminal liability (p. 151) 
Sikkink (2013) cites a few instances where this was done. One such instance occurred in March 
2002, a few months after Coalition forces occupied Afghanistan where a CIA lawyer made an 
“advance declination” request to the Justice Department (Sikkink, 2013, p. 151). In other words, 
a request for an “anticipatory ‘immunity’ or ‘pardon’ for interrogation practices” was made, in 
which the Justice Department refused to sign based on policy grounds (Sikkink, 2013, p. 151). 
However, Sikkink (2013) argues that the fact that the CIA put in such a request shows that Bush 
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administration officials were aware that their acts, it could be argued, went against domestic law 
and by extension international law (p. 151). This request made in early 2002, also suggests that 
from the beginning, Bush administration officials sought legal tools to protect themselves from 
acts that could have potentially provoked criminal liability (Sikkink, 2013, p. 151). Another 
instance surrounding the use of legislation to protect personnel was included in one of the first 
confidential memos, dated January 25, 2002 (Sikkink, 2013, p.152). As stated earlier, the Bush 
administration argued that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to detainees because of the 
War on Terror. Sikkink (2013) contends that by doing so, the Bush administration intended to 
make domestic prosecutions for torture less likely (p. 151). It should also be mentioned that the 
1996 US War Crimes Statue specifically criminalized grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
(Sikkink, 2013, p. 151). It was in the confidential memo dated January 25, 2002, that the threat 
of prosecution was cited as a reason to declare that detainees captured in Afghanistan were not 
protected under the Geneva Conventions (Sikkink, 2013, p. 152). Through the argument that the 
Geneva Conventions did not apply, the memo implied that torturing detainees would not be a 
breach of the Conventions, thus, the US War Crimes Statute (domestic legislation) would not 
apply and could not be used to prosecute individuals (Sikkink, 2013, p. 152). More specifically 
to Guantanamo Bay, Sikkink (2013) cites an instance where a commander there completed a 
“twelve-page request for permission for more aggressive forms of interrogation including 
waterboarding” (p. 152). His lawyer wrote that military officials who used those techniques 
could be committing crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (domestic military law), 
but that it might be solved with high level permission or immunity (Sikkink, 2013, p. 152). This 
use of legislation (immunity requests and the torture memos, backed by the blatant denial of the 
Geneva Conventions and the CAT) by Bush administration officials for protection against 
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prosecution is illustrative of the pro-war dimension of lawfare. Sikkink (2013) also states that the 
creation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which was passed by the Bush administration, 
strengthened the protection against prosecution already included in the Detainee Treatment Act 
(Sikkink, 2013, p. 155). It must be noted that the Detainee Treatment Act was also used by the 
Bush administration for legal protections. This Act banned cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment of prisoners, but Sikkink (2013) argues that the White house fought bitterly against it 
(p. 154). President Bush at one point threatened to veto it when it arrived on his desk (Sikkink, 
2013, p. 154). The Bill passed by a margin of 90-9 and its final version included language which 
provided legal protections for US personnel engaged in interrogations as the White House sought 
to exclude the CIA from complying with the Bill (Sikkink, 2013, pp. 154-155). Sikkink (2013) 
argues that this legislative language made prosecutions more difficult in US courts because 
statutory law stated that as long as US officials felt they were acting according to the law, they 
could not be convicted (Sikkink, 2013, p. 155).   
      The two categories that have been identified in Sikkink’s analysis thus far fall within the pro-
war aspect of lawfare i.e. the blatant denial or manipulation of international law and the use of 
legislation to protect personnel. However, the following category identified from an examination 
of her work falls within the anti-war use of lawfare employed by NGOs and lawyers. This use is 
illustrated through Sikkink’s analysis of the US Supreme Court’s rulings. Sikkink’s examination 
of these rulings not only adds to the purpose of this essay, but to the literature surrounding the 
concept of lawfare itself, in particular, Dunlap’s (2008) contention that recourse to the courts is a 
facet of lawfare to be encouraged, not discouraged (p. 149). Sikkink (2013) argues that, “the 
most serious opposition to Bush’s policy came from the US Supreme Court” (p. 155). Although 
it did not directly address torture, the landmark 2006 case of Hamadan v. Rumsfeld addressed the 
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legal claims made by the Bush administration in two central ways (Sikkink, 2013, p. 155).  
Firstly, it determined that the Geneva Conventions applied in Guantanamo Bay, where the Court 
ruled that the military commission system used to try detainees went against the Geneva 
Conventions and US domestic laws. Secondly, it rejected the claim of exclusive executive 
authority by upholding the Geneva Conventions and CAT (specifically Article 2) and US 
domestic law which states that a time of war does not suspend these principles of anti-torture 
(Sikkink, 2013, p. 155) 
      In contrast to Sikkink, Richter-Montpetit (2014) examines lawfare through the lens of “the 
legalization of state-administered suffering in custody with a focus on the Bush administration’s 
‘Torture Papers’”
35
 (p. 45). Richter-Montpetit (2014) credits scholars like Dunlap who made 
initial use of the concept of lawfare, “to denounce the use of law, in particular human rights and 
the laws of war, as a weapon of war against the [US]” (p. 48). However, she examines the 
concept of lawfare through her analysis of the use of post 9/11 “carceral lawfare” by the US 
government, specifically under the Bush administration, to create the new legal classification 
mentioned earlier, namely unlawful enemy combatants (Richter-Montpetit, 2014, p. 48). This 
“carceral lawfare” includes what Richter-Montpetit (2014) refers to as how both the Bush and 
Obama administrations “have sought to legalize a wide range of lethal and non-lethal security 
practices, including capture, rendition, indefinite detention [and] ‘enhanced interrogation’” (p. 
48). These “practices”, mainly the detention of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay “evoke a state of 
lawlessness or exception” where Richter-Montpetit (2014) argues that both administrations have 
gone through great lengths “to suspend the law” (p. 48).  
                                                 
35
 Also referred to as the ‘torture memos’. 
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   Two weeks after Rumsfeld’s announcement in 2002 that Guantanamo bay detainees would be 
treated as unlawful combatants, not as prisoners of war, Richter-Montpetit (2014) notes that 
“White House Counsel, Alberto Gonzales, advised President Bush in a memorandum that the 
War against Terrorism was a new kind of war, one that rendered the Geneva Conventions 
inapplicable” (p. 48). Richter-Montpetit adds that in the words of Gonzales: 
The nature of the new war places a high premium on ... factors such as the ability to 
quickly obtain information from captured terrorists...to avoid further atrocities against 
American civilians.... [T]his new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations 
on questioning enemy prisoners (Richter-Montpetit, 2014, p. 48).   
Richter-Montpetit (2014) argues that it was on the basis of Gonzales’ memo that President Bush 
subsequently issued a directive to the US National Security Council on February 7, 2002, 
declaring that captured Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were not prisoners of war and therefore, 
the Geneva Conventions did not apply to them (p. 49).  
      Richter-Montpetit (2014) contends that the legal classification, “unlawful enemy combatant” 
for War on Terror detainees effectively sought to place them outside the reach of the laws of war 
and more generally, the rule of law (p. 49). Furthermore, the memos attempted to establish that 
these unlawful enemy combatants in off shore facilities, including Guantanamo Bay, had no right 
to access US courts and that the judiciary had no oversight role for the government’s overseas 
detention policies (Richter-Montpetit, 2014, p. 49). Also in the February 7 directive, President 
Bush claimed that “via executive fiat, the president had the unilateral authority ‘to arrest virtually 
anyone... if he deemed them an enemy combatant’” (Richter-Montpetit, 2014, p. 49). As 
mentioned earlier, this claim of exclusive executive authority was rejected by the Supreme Court 
in Hamadan v Rumsfeld where the Geneva Conventions and CAT were upheld (Sikkink, 2013, p. 
  
 39 
155). This claim by President Bush, which sought to make his executive discretion justified is 
applicable to the examination of his administration’s use of lawfare. This is so, as it can be 
argued that this claim of executive authority falls within the pro-war use of lawfare and was used 
in an effort to circumvent international legal instruments like the Geneva Conventions and the 
CAT.  
      Like Sikknik (2013), Richter-Montpetit argues that there were concerns among CIA staff 
about the potential of prosecution for their interrogation practices. These concerns led to the 
creation of the torture memos by government lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel (Richter-
Montpetit, 2014, p. 49). Richter-Montpetit offers a similar analysis to that proposed by Sikknik 
(2013) in that she highlights how the 2002 Bybee memorandum created a narrow definition of 
torture, which was contrary to existing international law. In this memo, quoted above in the 
analysis of Sikknik’s work, Bybee essentially argues that in order to define an act as torture, it 
must be highly severe and must be equivalent in intensity similar to pain which accompanies 
very far reaching occurrences such as “organ failure” and “death”. Adding to this narrow 
definition, the memorandum stressed that for an action to be considered torture, it requires 
‘specific intent’ (Richter-Montpetit, 2014, p. 50). This ‘specific intent’ meant that “‘the infliction 
of such [severe] pain must be the defendant’s precise objective’” (Richter Montpetit, 2014, p. 
50). Bybee continues that even if the defendant is aware that severe pain will result from his 
actions, if causing harm is not his objective, then it is not done with specific intent and therefore 
cannot be classified as torture in the criminal context (Richter-Montpetit, 2014, p. 50).  
Furthermore, Bybee states that: 
As commander in chief, President Bush has the constitutional authority to order 
interrogations of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information ... Congress may no 
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more regulate the President’s ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it 
may regulate his ability to direct troop movement on the battlefield (Richter-Montpetit, 
2014, p. 50).  
Reinstating the claim of President Bush’s exclusive executive authority, this quote shows how 
the 2002 Bybee memo also reasoned that “any legal limits on the way interrogations on enemy 
combatants are conducted ‘would be an unconstitutional infringement of the President’s 
authority to conduct war’” (p. 50).  The memo also justified violations of US law regarding 
torture by “‘necessity or self-defense.... to elicit information to prevent a ...threat to the United 
States and its citizens’” (Richter-Montpetit, 2014, p. 50). The second 2002 memo prepared by 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, for Gonzales replicated much of Bybee’s memo in 
terms of legality of enhanced interrogation methods (Richter-Montpetit, 2014, p. 50). It spoke to 
the severe pain needed for acts to constitute as torture and the “specific intent” of the defendant. 
Yoo also states that, “in his capacity as commander-in-chief, President Bush has the capacity to 
overwrite any US laws banning the use of torture” (Richter-Montpetit, 2014, p. 50).  
      Finally, and very integral to this thesis, Richter-Montpetit (2014) argues that “the torture 
memos extend the official battlefield in the War on Terror away from the declared warzones in 
Afghanistan and Iraq” (p. 51). This “War on Terror battlefield” is extended into secret CIA run 
detention facilities across the globe (Richter, 2014, p. 51). Richter-Montpetit (2014) contends 
that the memos render lawful, acts which constitute torture in international and even US 
domestic law (p. 51).  
      The concept of lawfare applies more heavily to the Bush administration given the obvious 
reason that the 9/11 attacks occurred during his presidency. Thus, his response to the War on 
Terror at the time involved what Yin (2011) calls legal ‘mistakes’ made by the Bush 
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administration through an “‘ends justify means’ approach” with regards to Guantanamo Bay (p. 
454). He also argues that the Obama administration made mistakes due to an overreaction to 
Bush policies through what he terms as an “‘anything but Bush’ approach” (Yin, 2011, p. 455). 
For Yin (2011), President Bush’s legal mistakes included detention without charges
36
, abusive 
and coercive interrogation tactics, lack of a formal process
37
, taking aggressive legal positions 
among others. However, Yin (2011) contends that both Bush and Obama’s ‘mistakes’ stem from 
a similar flaw: “the absence of a clear strategy for integrating military force and law enforcement 
in responding to the threat posed by Al Qaeda” (p. 455). This flaw could explain the Bush 
administration’s extensive use of lawfare through his ‘mistakes’. Although as will be seen in the 
following analysis of the reports that this essay will review, President Obama, upon taking 
office, released executive orders directing the Defense Department to close Guantanamo Bay. In 
comparing the administrations, Yin (2011) argues that Bush recognized the negative impact that 
Guantanamo Bay had on the US’ image and indicated his preference to close the base, but 
asserted the need to hold inmates there until the government sought suitable courts to prosecute 
them (Yin, 2011, p. 474). Yin (2011), states that, had Obama followed through on this promise, 
then the question of whether he learned from the mistakes of the Bush administration might have 
been answered differently (p. 474).   
      As will be seen in the analysis of the reports between the US and the CAT Committee 
Against Torture, the 2014 report on the CIA’s interrogation and detention program, authored by 
the US Senate Select CAT Committee on Intelligence, exposed the use of torture which has been 
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 By February 2011, most remaining detainees remained uncharged and Supreme court cases such as Hamdi v 
Rumsfeld upheld the President’s authority to detain ‘enemy combatants’ without charges (Yin, 2011, p. 456). 
37 According to Yin (2011), the Bush administration’s legal mistake was the failure to establish a formal process 
for determining the combatant status of Guantanamo Bay detainees (p. 461).  
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condemned by the Obama administration (Lellio and Castano, 2015, p. 1281). Echoing Yin’s 
argument that the Obama administration took an ‘anything but Bush’ stance, Lellio and Castano 
(2015) argue that this condemnation by the Obama administration has come due to the steps 
taken to reverse Bush’s policy on torture and criticism that had been mounting. However, as the 
criticism against Obama for not prosecuting anyone who has approved or practiced torture 
increased, Lellio and Castano (2015) argue that the administration’s inactions contravened the 
US’ obligations under Article 7 of the CAT, which refers to fair prosecution of offenders of 
torture
38
. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur on 
counterterrorism and human rights have also demanded accountability for these violations 
(Lellio and Castano, 2015, p. 1283).  
 
      This previous section examined the anti-war and pro-war dimensions of concept of lawfare in 
order to establish the theoretical framework for the essay’s comparative analysis of the Bush and 
Obama administrations in their reporting to the CAT and the CAT’s responses to these reports. 
The following section will provide an analysis of the dialogue between the CAT Committee and 
the US as well as linkages to how lawfare was used.  
 
III. The dialogue between the US and UN CAT Committee  
                                                 
38
 Article 7 of the CAT states that a person under the jurisdiction of a State Party who has allegedly committed an 
offence, must be prosecuted, if they are not extradited. The relevant authorities should treat their decision in the 
same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. Any person 
regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be 
guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.  
 
UNHCR (1987). CAT. Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx (accessed 
April 13, 2018).  
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    This section will examine the points of comparison for both administrations identified in the 
analysis of the dialogue between the CAT Committee and the US through an examination of the 
reports listed below. These points of comparison concern four key areas: 1) the application of the 
Third Geneva Convention and the CAT to the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay; 2) the judicial 
process, specifically pertaining to the allegations of torture by US officials overseas; 3) military 
commissions; and 4) interrogation techniques. The following is an analysis of six documents 
which represent the dialogue between the Bush and Obama administrations and the CAT 
Committee on these four key areas of analysis. As stated earlier, these documents include the 
2005 2nd Periodic Report of the US to the CAT Committee, the 2006 Concluding Observations of 
the CAT Committee, the 2007 Follow-up Report by the US to the CAT Committee’s 
Recommendations (all completed during the Bush administration); the 2013 3rd to 5th Reports of 
the US to the CAT Committee, the 2014 Concluding Observations of the CAT Committee and the 
2015 Follow-up Report by the US to the CAT Committee’s Recommendations on the Combined 
Reports (all completed during the Obama administration).  
 
A. The application of international legal instruments  
      The issue of the US’ application of the Geneva Conventions and CAT at all times, including 
during armed conflict will first be analyzed. The 2nd Periodic Report of the US to the CAT 
Committee (2005) states President Bush announced that although the CAT applied to Taliban 
detainees, they were not entitled to ‘prisoner of war’ (POW) status (p. 52).
39
 This further led to 
                                                 
39 According to the Bush administration: “The Taliban have not effectively distinguished themselves from the 
civilian population of Afghanistan. Moreover, they have not conducted their operations in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war. Instead, they have knowingly adopted and provided support to the unlawful terrorist objectives 
of the Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is an international terrorist group and cannot be considered a state party to the Geneva 
Convention. Its members, therefore, are not covered by the Geneva Convention, and are not entitled to POW status 
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the conclusion by the Bush administration that these detainees were classified as “enemy 
combatants” to whom the Third Geneva Convention did not apply (State Dpt., 2005, pp. 52-53). 
Upon reviewing this particular issue of the application of the CAT, the CAT Committee 
expressed concern over the US’ opinion and recommended an application of the CAT at all 
times, including any territory under its jurisdiction. In contrast, the Obama administration agreed 
with the CAT Committee’s assessment in the 3rd to 5th reports of the US to the CAT Committee 
(2013), which affirmed the position that there was no excuse for the use of torture and that the 
CAT applied at all times (p. 7).  In responding to the Obama administration (and in contrast to its 
response to the report submitted during the Bush administration), the CAT Committee listed this 
as a “positive aspect” and reiterated its position that neither does a time of war or armed conflict 
suspend the CAT and that it is applicable at all times (UN CAT Committee, 2014).  
       The Bush administration, in its follow-up report stated that the laws of war, and not the CAT 
is the applicable legal framework as it pertains to the issue of detentions (State Dpt., 2007, p. 7). 
Also, it was emphasized that the US was in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
their supporters at that time. Because of this, the report states that the laws of war entitle the US 
to detain and hold “enemy combatants” until hostilities end (State Dpt., 2007, p. 7). This position 
shares stark similarities to the Bush administration’s position in the 2nd Periodic Report to the 
CAT Committee. In reiterating this position and in defense of holding ‘enemy combatants’, the 
Bush administration stated that detainee interrogations are conducted under the CAT, the 2005 
Detainee Treatment Act, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and domestic law, which 
all prohibit torture and inhumane treatment of individuals (State Dpt., 2007, p.7). However, the 
                                                 
under the treaty.” Statement by the U.S. Press Secretary, The James S. Brady Briefing Room, in Washington, D.C. 




distinction made by the Bush administration that the laws of war and not the CAT applied to 
Guantanamo detentions is noteworthy. The Obama administration, in its follow-up report 
reiterated its position by stating that although the laws of armed conflict (the “laws of war” to 
which the Bush administration was referring to) fall under the controlling body of law with 
respect to the conduct of hostilities, a “time of war does not suspend the operation of the CAT, 
which continues to apply even when a State is engaged in armed conflict” (State Dpt., 2015, 6). 
Here, the Obama administration echoed its previous position that the CAT applies to the 




B. Allegations of torture (Judicial Process) 
      One point of similarity between both administrations regarding detention facilities surrounds 
the inquiries into allegations of torture by US officials overseas. These investigations followed 
concerns raised over what detention and interrogation practices were authorized on the basis of a 
memorandum drafted by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel in August 2002 
(one of the legal memos) which interpreted the extraterritorial criminal torture statute
40
 and the 
2004 release of government documents related to interrogation techniques and U.S. laws 
regarding torture. During the Bush presidency, extensive investigative reports were carried out 
by the Department of Defense and “none of them found that government policy directed, 
                                                 
40 The definition of torture is codified in US law through the United States Code. The extraterritorial criminal 
torture statute is one such way this definition is codified. Specifically, at Chapter 113B of Title 18 of the United 
States Code, which provides federal criminal jurisdiction over an extraterritorial act or attempted act of torture if (1) 
the alleged offender is a national of the United States or (2) if the alleged offender is present in the United States, 
irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender (State Department, 2005 2nd Periodic report, p. 5). 
  
 46 
encouraged or condoned these abuses” (State Dpt., 2005, p. 63). Also, in the 2005 report 
submitted to the CAT by the Bush administration, a statement by White House counsel, Alberto 
Gonzales was included which said that the President did not condone any activity that constituted 
a transgression of the CAT (State Dpt., 2005, p. 21). The CAT Committee also expressed 
concern over lenient sentences in investigations of abuse, which sometimes involved death, by 
military and civilian personnel (UN CAT Committee, 2006, 26). Similarly, during the Obama 
administration, the Department of Justice carried out many investigations and reviews on 
interrogation practices, including the deaths of two inmates in CIA custody overseas (State Dpt., 
2013, p. 49). These investigations were closed in 2012 after the Justice Department determined 
that the admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt (State Dpt., 2013, p. 50). In responding to the Obama administration, the CAT 
Committee identified this as a failure to fully investigate these allegations and expressed concern 
about some CIA detainees who were never interviewed during these investigations. It further 
recommended a thorough investigation to be carried out, the prosecution of alleged perpetrators 
of abuses, compensation to victims and a full review of the CIA’s responsibilities (UN CAT 
Committee, 2014).  
       In response to the CAT Committee’s recommendation to close Guantanamo Bay and permit 
judicial access by enemy combatants, the Bush administration’s follow up report stated that those 
two issues “lacked arguable basis” in the Convention (State Dpt., 2007, p. 5) This was explained 
by the Bush administration’s contention that there were consequences to releasing dangerous 
terrorist combatants detained in Guantanamo and that there was concern over where individuals 
who could not be repatriated might be sent (State Dpt., 2007, p. 5). According to the Bush 
administration, this was a reason for its rejection to closing Guantanamo Bay. The CAT 
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Committee, in its concluding observations, also recommended that judicial access be permitted 
to detainees and expressed concern over the use of CSRTs and Annual Review Boards (ARBs) 
by the US (UN CAT Committee, 2006). In its follow-up report response, the Bush administration 
defended the use of the CSRTs and the ARBs as mechanisms whereby detainees could have 
access to the courts (State Dpt., 2007, p. 6). In explaining how these mechanisms work, the Bush 
administration stated that, along with the purpose of evaluating whether a detainee was properly 
classified as an enemy combatant, the decision could be appealed to a US domestic civilian court 
(State Dpt., 2007, p. 6). The Bush administration, in its follow-up report identified this 
opportunity for judicial review (being able to appeal domestically) as exceeding the 
“requirements of the law of war” and “unprecedented and expanded protection available to all 
detainees...more extensive than those applied by any other nation in....armed conflict to 
determine a combatant’s status” (State Dpt., 2007, p. 6). The follow-up report further provides 
statistics on the number of detainees who had departed Guantanamo Bay (120 detainees) since 
the CAT Committee’s recommendations to close the facility and provide judicial access the 
detainees in May 2006. Furthermore, it stated that 375 detainees were at Guantanamo Bay at the 
time, 405 released or transferred and 75 eligible for transfer or release because of the Department 
of Defense’s (DoD) review process. In response to the recommendation to close Guantanamo 
Bay, President Obama’s widely known intention to do so as per his executive orders was 
included in its follow-up report (State Dpt., 2015, 33). The CAT Committee was pleased with the 
Obama administration’s upholding of habeas corpus and periodic review process for detainees. 
However, it expressed concern over the large number of detainees who had their habeas corpus 
petitions rejected and the small number designated for potential prosecution (UN CAT 
Committee, 2014). In its follow up report, the Obama administration responded to this by stating 
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that detainees whose habeas petitions have been denied or dismissed, would continue to have 
access to counsel pursuant to the same terms applicable when their proceedings were pending 
(State Dpt., 2015, 37). Also, the Obama administration in its follow-up report, mentioned that 
those who had prevailed in habeas proceedings had been repatriated or resettled. Specifically, 
“more detainees were transferred out of the facility in 2014 than in any year since 2009 and the 
detainee population stands at its lowest since 2002” (State Dpt., 2015, 35). The CAT Committee 
noted as a positive development the Obama administration’s introduction of the periodic review 
process to review whether the detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay remained necessary 
(UN CAT Committee, 2014). In the 2015 follow-up report, the Obama administration mentioned 
that as of that same year, 22 full hearings and six-month file reviews were conducted, where it 
was determined that the detention of 15 detainees was no longer necessary to protect against a 
threat to the security of the US (State Dpt., 2015, 36). Three of these detainees were transferred 
to their countries of origin while the remaining 12 were eligible for transfer (State Dpt., 2015, 
36).  It is worth noting that this periodic review process is a move from the ARBs implemented 
during the Bush presidency. Instead of an annual review of detainees’ status as “enemy 
combatants”, a 6-month review was implemented by President Obama where detainees were able 
to participate with assistance from personal representatives and sometimes private counsel (State 
Dpt., 2015, 36).  
     In response to criticism by the international community and concern from the CAT 
Committee over proper investigations of abuse at detention facilities, the Obama administration 
in its 2015 follow-up report listed the various laws in place which provide the authority to 
conduct investigations of allegations of torture, whether it was committed outside or on US 
territory (State Dpt., 2015 11). These laws are based on the US Common Core (USC) document 
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where guidelines for strengthening legal safeguards are codified (State Dpt., 2015, 12).  
Consistent with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which prohibits torture of anyone in US 
custody regardless of their nationality or location, these mechanisms/laws include the Torture 
Convention Implementation Act that gives the Department of Justice the authority to prosecute 
US nationals who commit or attempt to commit torture (State Dpt., 2015, 13). Also included is 
the Uniform code of Military Justice which was amended to include court-martial jurisdiction 
over persons serving with an armed force in the field, not only in time of declared war, but 
during contingency operations (State Dpt., 2015, 21). In terms of developments, the Foreign 
Claims Act allowed redress for inhabitants of foreign countries. This resulted in 36 claimants 
alleging detainee abuse and/or maltreatment in Iraq and compensation being awarded for five 
substantiated allegations of detainee abuse there (State Dpt., 2015, 20). Furthermore, according 
to the Obama administration’s follow-up report, “thousands of investigations” have been carried 
out by the DoD and it has prosecuted or disciplined hundreds of service members for misconduct 
including the mistreatment of detainees (State Dpt., 2015, 31).  
 
C. Military Commissions 
      The issue of military commissions differentiated the Bush and Obama administrations in 
terms of their use of the commissions and the CAT Committee’s response to their use. It must be 
noted that the military commissions were authorized under the Military Commissions Act which 
was revised over the years. In its report submitted to the CAT Committee under the Bush 
Administration, the US held the position that the Geneva Conventions recognized “military fora” 
as a legitimate channel to try individuals (State Dpt., 2005, p. 58).  The noteworthy cases of 
Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld were mentioned by the US as examples of such military 
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fora used to try detainees. In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court decided on jurisdiction and held 
that persons outside of the US could file habeas corpus cases. Meanwhile, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
the Supreme Court held that the US could detain enemy combatants and that “detention was 
necessary and appropriate” to prevent them from committing any future acts of violence (State 
Dpt., 2005, p. 59).  The CAT Committee in its concluding observations marked the Military 
Commissions Act as a positive development in light of the fact that, “military commissions shall 
not admit statements established to be made as a result of torture in evidence”, while also 
expressing concern over the use of these commissions (UN CAT Committee, 2006, 30). This 
concern was about the implementation of the commissions and limitations of detainee’s right to 
complain about abuses and unlawful detention. The CAT Committee also expressed concern 
over CSRTs and ARBs. CSRTs were designed by the Bush administration to ascertain combatant 
status of detainees, while ARBs were designed to determine if the government was justified in 
continuing to hold detainees at Guantanamo Bay (Yin, 2011, pp. 461-462). In another case- 
Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court criticized CSRTs for various flaws, which were similar 
to those identified by the CAT Committee. These “flaws” included detainees not being entitled 
to counsel and provided with a military officer to assist only as a ‘personal representative’ (Yin, 
2011, p. 461). CSRTs were also criticized as the detainee was only entitled to see the 
unclassified evidence supporting his classification as an enemy combatant (Yin, 2011, p.  461). 
Added to the criticisms were that the ‘personal representative’ only had access to classified 
evidence, but was not able to share it with the detainee (Yin, 2011, p. 461). Yin (2011) also 
states that one study of CSRTs revealed how “detainees were often unable to defend themselves, 
because critical allegations were redacted” (p. 462).  However, through the state report submitted 
under the Obama administration, it is clear that a change was introduced to the formal process 
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for Guantanamo Bay trials. Under Obama, there was a change to the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 in 2009 which addressed many of the “flaws” of CSRTs. It is also evident that this was 
the goal as the US State Department report (2013) explicitly states that these changes were made 
following the results of Boumediene v. Bush case (p. 21). The new Military Commissions Act of 
2009 upheld the previous provision that prohibited the admission of statements obtained through 
torture (expect in certain circumstances), it strengthened restrictions on hearsay, provided the 
accused on capital cases with counsel, enhanced the accused’s right to discover and offered a 
review of final judgments (State Dpt., 2013, p. 18). Also, as per President Obama’s executive 
orders, the Supreme Court decision (Boumediene v. Bush) regarding the jurisdiction of habeas 
corpus for detainees at Guantanamo Bay was upheld. Of noteworthy importance is that the report 
submitted to the CAT Committee during the Obama administration makes it clear that this 
process is separate from the executive branch (which includes the military). This clarification is 
of significant contrast to the increased role of the military in petitions filed by detainees under 
the Bush administration. Included in Obama’s executive orders was also the introduction of a 
process of periodic review for detainees at Guantanamo Bay who had not been convicted, 
charged, designated or transferred (State Dpt., 2013, pp. 21-22). According to the state report 
submitted under Obama, it was ensured that this process of periodic review was consistent with 
the CAT, Geneva Convention and Detainee Treatment Act (State Dpt., 2013, p. 22). The 
executive orders which included the periodic review process as well as the use of the decision in 
Boumediene v. Bush by the Obama administration were all commended as positive changes by 
the UN CAT Committee (UN CAT Committee, 2014, B, a, b, c). However, in identifying 
concerns and providing recommendations, the CAT Committee stated that although detainees 
have the “constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus”, figures provided by the US 
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indicate that the federal courts have rejected a significant number habeas corpus petitions (UN 
CAT Committee, 2014). In response to the Obama administration’s state report, the CAT 
Committee (2014) stated that, “out of the 148 men at Guantanamo Bay, only 33 have been 
designated for potential prosecution and the latter fail to meet international fair trial standards”. 
The CAT Committee (2014) further noted that “36 others have been designated for continued 
law of war detention”. It recommended to the Obama administration that indefinite detention 
should be ceased, “potential prosecution detainees to be charge and tried in federal courts and 
access to all evidence by detainees” (UN CAT Committee, 2014). Also, it expressed concern 
over the secrecy which surrounded the torture practices at Guantanamo Bay and recommended 
the declassification of the torture evidence, with minimal redactions (UN CAT Committee, 
2014).  
 
D. Interrogation techniques 
      Interrogation techniques used at Guantanamo Bay are also a significant point of analysis in 
the reports between the administrations. The Bush administration was criticized by many for the 
use of “authorized interrogation techniques” used at Guantanamo Bay, which included, but were 
not limited to stress positons, waterboarding and the use of dogs for fear (which resulted in death 
in some cases) (UN CAT Committee, 2006, C, 24). In the 2005 state report to the CAT 
Committee, (submitted during the Bush administration), it was noted that investigations were 
carried out into allegations of abuse and as previously mentioned, there was no link found 
between the authorized interrogation techniques and the abuse that occurred, not only at 
Guantanamo Bay, but in detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In a review done in 2004, 
the Naval Inspector General stated that it had found that the “Secretary of Defense’s directions 
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with respect to human treatment of detainees and interrogation techniques were fully 
implemented” (State Dpt., 2005, p. 64). Consequently, a review of Department of Defense 
operations at the detention facilities found that out of the 24, 000 interrogations sessions that 
occurred since the beginning of operations, “only three cases of closed substantiated 
interrogation-related abuse exceeded the bounds of interrogation policy and consisted of minor 
assaults” (State Dpt., 2005, pp. 64-65). Furthermore, the Church Report
41
, released in 2005 
found “no link between approved interrogation techniques and detainee abuse” (State Dpt., 2005, 
pp. 65). Meanwhile, the state report submitted under the Obama administration noted that, 
pursuant to his executive order on ensuring lawful interrogations, the Army Field Manual (AFM) 
was designated as appropriate guidance on interrogation for military interrogators and it 
prohibited any interrogation technique not authorized or listed in the AFM (State Dpt., 2013, p. 
14, 41). Along with listing numerous interrogations techniques to be prohibited (including water 
boarding etc.), it provided a guide to be used while formulating interrogation plans for approval 
(State Dpt., 2013, p. 42). In responding to the 2013 state report, the CAT Committee commended 
President Obama’s 2014 public statement, “in which he qualified some of the so-called 
                                                 
41
 According to the 2nd Periodic Report, concerns had been generated by the August 1, 2002, memorandum 
prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, on the definition of torture and the possible 
defenses to torture under U.S. law. The August 1 memorandum was withdrawn on June 22, 2004 and replaced with 
a December 30, 2004, memorandum interpreting the legal standards applicable under the United States Code, also 
known as the Federal Torture Statute. On March 10, 2005 Vice Admiral Church (the former U.S. Naval Inspector 
General) released an executive summary of his report, which included an examination of this issue. His Report 
examined the precise question of ‘whether the Department of Defense (DoD) had promulgated interrogation policies 
or guidance that directed, sanctioned or encouraged the abuse of detainees.’ In a subsequent report, the Naval 
Inspector General engaged in a comprehensive review of DoD detention operations and detainee interrogation 
operations covering Guantanamo Bay, Iraq and Afghanistan. This report expanded upon his earlier findings with 
respect to interrogation operations at Guantanamo, noting that while “There have been over 24,000 interrogation 
sessions since the beginning of interrogation operations, there are only three cases of closed, substantiated 
interrogation-related abuse, all consisting of minor assaults in which MI interrogators, exceeded the bounds of 
approved interrogation policy.” He also highlighted that there was no link between approved interrogation 
techniques and prisoner abuse (State Dpt., 2005, p. 63). Accessed April 8, 2018. 
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‘enhanced interrogation-techniques’ as acts of torture” (UN CAT Committee, 2014). Although it 
acknowledged the US’ reservation that some of the authorized methods in the AFM were 
consistent with the CAT, it noted that some aspects of the AFM still left room for possibilities of 
abuse. In saying that, the CAT Committee recommended the abolishment of techniques 
regarding “physical separation technique”
 42
 which could amount to sleep-deprivation 
(categorized as “ill-treatment” according to the CAT) and sensory deprivation
43
  which also 
raised concerns of the probability of torture and ill treatment of detainees (UN CAT Committee, 
2014).  
     In response to the Bush administration’s state report, the CAT Committee provided the 
recommendation that the US, should “rescind any interrogation technique including... sexual 
humiliation, ‘waterboarding’, short shackling [etc.] that constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, in all places of detention under its de facto effective control, 
in order to comply with its obligations under the Convention Against Torture” (UN CAT 
Committee, 2006, 24). The Bush administration responded by citing various US legislation 
which identified torture and the conspiracy to commit torture as crimes against which detainees 
should be protected (State Dpt., 2007, p. 7). These are the Detainee Treatment Act of 2006 and 
the extraterritorial torture statute. Along with these prohibitions, the report states that “all 
                                                 
42
 Physical separation allows for the detainee to get four hours of continued sleep every 4 hours in a 24-hour period. 
The Committee determined that this provision in the AFM amounted to sleep deprivation — a form of ill-treatment 
—, and is unrelated to the aim of the ‘physical separation technique’, which is preventing communication among 
detainees. UN CAT Committee. (2014). Concluding Observations on the US’ 2nd 3rd and 5th report, (accessed March 
22, 2018). 
43
 Sensory deprivation falls under the ‘field expedient separation technique’ which is aimed at prolonging the shock 
of capture, by using goggles or blindfolds and earmuffs on detainees in order to generate the perception of 
separation. The UN CAT Committee stated that, based on recent scientific findings, sensory deprivation for long 
durations has a high probability of creating a psychotic-like state in the detainee, which raises concerns of torture 
and ill-treatment. Ibid, (accessed March 22, 2018). 
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detainee interrogations were to be conducted in a manner consistent with Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Convention and greater applicable law of war protections” (State Dpt., 2007, p. 7). 
Also, consistent with this section of the Geneva Convention were an updated Department of 
Defense detainee program directive and the revised AFM
44
. It was also reiterated that enemy 
prisoners of war were protected under the laws of war and “minimum standards prescribed by 
Common Article 3” (State Dpt., 2007, p. 8). The CAT Committee also expressed concern over 
torture practices and recommended the declassification of torture evidence. In its follow up 
report, the Obama administration stated that one development that was noted was the 
declassification of the contents of the White House’s report on the CIA’s former detention and 
interrogation program by the Select Senate Committee and under the determination of President 
Obama (State Dpt., 2015, 7). The Senate Select Committee subsequently produced this report in 
2014 which contained a review of the program which included interrogation methods used on 
terrorism suspects in secret facilities outside of the US (State Dpt., 2015, 8). President Obama 
determined that the “executive summary, findings, and conclusions” of the report on the CIA’s 
former detention and interrogation program be released to the public with appropriate redactions 
(State Dpt., 2015, 7). The use of harsh interrogation techniques and the program was ended and 
prohibited in President Obama’s executive order after which he signed the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (State Dpt., 2015, 8). It is in this piece of legislation that 
his executive order regarding provisions for the interrogation reforms was made into law (State 
Dpt., 2015, 8). These reforms codified in the 2016 Act include the prohibition of harsh 
interrogation techniques included in the abovementioned Select Senate CAT Committee report 
                                                 
44
 Department of the Army. (2006). Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 
Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/150085.pdf (accessed February 4, 2018). 
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on the former CIA program (State Dpt., 2015, 8). Concerning the AFM, as stated in the previous 
analysis, the CAT Committee acknowledged that some interrogation methods listed in the AFM 
were consistent with the Convention, but some aspects still left room for abuse such as physical 
separation and sensory deprivation (UN CAT Committee, 2014). In response, the Obama 
administration, similar to the Bush administration stated that persons detained during armed 
conflict must be treated in accordance with domestic policy and treaty obligations. However, in 
response to the CAT Committee’s recommendation with regards to the AFM, the Obama 
administration stated that it was binding on all relevant bodies and that the Department of the 
Army conducts yearly reviews of the AFM to ensure consistency with domestic law policy and 
practice and also to asses for needed updates due to lessons learned from operations (State Dpt., 
2015, 41). Also, the Obama administration’s state report asserts that provisions in the AFM, 
including those related to “physical separation” and “field expedient separation” (some of the 
interrogation techniques that the Bush administration was criticized for) must be applied with the 
manual’s policy and guidelines which explicitly contain the provisions for detainees to be treated 
humanely and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment regardless of their status 
(State Dpt., 2015, 42). In addition, the report states that the manual has procedural requirements 
so that certain techniques could not be “read or used in a such way as to be inconsistent with” the 
general guidelines of the AFM (State Dpt., 2015, 43). The CAT Committee also recommended 
the abolishment of separation techniques and sensory deprivation (UN CAT Committee, 2014). 
The State Department in its report under the Obama administration stated that the use of 
separation is applied consistently with the AFM guidelines and that nothing in the AFM 




      This section, which has examined the dialogue between both administrations and the CAT 
Committee brings to light further linkages with the concept of lawfare, which was discussed in 
the review of literature. As both the analysis of reports and review of literature reveal many 
specific connections, a brief summary of the findings will be done in the following section.  
 
IV. Summary of Findings  
         The concept of lawfare is important to this research in providing a conceptual framework 
for the empirical evidence analyzed i.e. the reports by and to the CAT Committee. In this essay, 
the concept of lawfare reveals how international law can be used as a tool by governments and 
most notably, the US government during the Bush administration. The main findings of this 
thesis are as follows: 1) The Bush administration’s actions confirm the manipulation of 
international law through the pro-war dimension of lawfare; 2) The Obama administration did 
not manipulate international law, but reflected tenets of the anti-war dimension of lawfare; 3) 
The concept of lawfare is nuanced and multifaceted.  
      Many of the ways in which the Bush administration manipulated international law reflect the 
pro-war dimension of lawfare. One such way was through the blatant denial of international legal 
instruments. Through this determination in statements, the torture memos and state reports to the 
CAT Committee, the CAT and the Geneva Conventions were rendered inapplicable. Scholars 
such as Sikkink (2013) argue that through the determination that international law did not apply 
and the creation of the unlawful combatant category, it could be argued that the use of torture 
was made permissible (p. 150). The CAT Committee’s concern over these determinations and 
enhanced interrogation techniques used during the Bush administration further reflect aspects of 
the pro-war dimension of lawfare. This dimension was also reflected in the Bush 
  
 58 
administration’s use of legislation to protect CIA officials from prosecution for crimes which 
would have resulted from their engagement in torture practices that violated international and 
domestic law. As mentioned earlier, tenets of the CAT and Geneva Conventions were included 
in domestic law, such as the US War Crimes Act. Therefore, if CIA officials were properly 
investigated and prosecuted, then they would have been criminally convicted under US law in 
addition to the US contravening articles in the CAT and Geneva Conventions. As examined in 
this essay, the Bush administration sought to navigate around its obligations through claims that 
international law did not apply, as well as through requests for immunity from interrogation 
practices which occurred at Guantanamo Bay. Also, the Bush administration fought heavily to 
include protection for CIA personnel through its praise of domestic legislation such as the 2005 
Detainee Treatment Act in its state report, while still using this same Act to protect personnel 
from prosecution. Also, the reports reveal that this protection of personnel further extended 
through the Bush administration’s use of military commissions where detainees were not able to 
see classified evidence which categorized them as combatants, had no counsel, among other 
flaws identified by the CAT Committee. Furthermore, this essay examined how the Bush 
administration’s manipulation of the law through pro-war lawfare was a reaction to the ‘anti-
war’ aspect of lawfare ever-present in the critique mounted against it by the international 
community.  
      Another finding identified through this analysis is that the Obama administration did not 
manipulate international law, but some of his actions reflected tenets of the anti-war dimension 
of lawfare. Most of the content of the reports submitted during the Obama administration 
denounced the actions of the Bush administration, echoing much of the concerns made by the 
CAT Committee. The Obama administration, in its 2013 state report agreed with the CAT 
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Committee that the Geneva Conventions and CAT applied at all times. Furthermore, through his 
executive orders, Obama declared the Bush administration’s legal memos “null and void”, thus 
making enhanced interrogation tactics and the unlawful enemy combatant category at 
Guantanamo Bay inapplicable (Forsythe, 2011, p. 781). Much like the CAT Committee, the 
Obama administration identified the Bush administration’s legal tactics and rejected them. This 
can be seen through the examination of the issue of military commissions between both 
administrations. The Bush administration, through the Military Commissions Act of 2006 not 
only sought to protect CIA officials, but denied detainees fair access to the courts. The CAT 
Committee (and the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush) expressed its concerns over this, and 
the Obama administration revised the 2006 Military Commissions Act in 2009 which remedied 
many flaws of the military commissions under Bush. Along with this change, the Obama 
administration made this judicial process separate from the executive branch (which includes the 
military) as opposed to the heavy role that the executive played in the Bush administration’s 
military commissions. Therefore, while the Bush administration denied detainees judicial access 
and protected CIA officials through legal means (through domestic legislation such as the 2006 
Military Commissions Act and War Crimes Act), the Obama administration, also through legal 
means addressed Bush’s abuse of the law. This occurred through his revision of the Military 
Commissions Act in 2009 which gave detainees easier access to the courts by introducing a 6-
month revision process (instead of the annual process under Bush), declassifying information 
regarding enhanced interrogation techniques, among other changes mentioned in the Obama 
administration’s follow-up report. Obama’s actions thus, to an extent reflect tenets of the anti-
war dimension of lawfare, where the law is revered as a mechanism to constrain state behavior 
during warfare. In stark comparison to his predecessor, the Obama administration, in its reports 
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to the CAT Committee affirm some of the US’ commitments to the CAT and Geneva 
Conventions. This was done through the Obama administration’s denouncement of the 
inapplicability of international law to detainees in its periodic reports and its enactment of 
various legislation which improved detainee’s judicial access (as mentioned previously) and 
provided improved guidelines for military personnel’s treatment of detainees.  
      Finally, this essay reveals the nuanced, multifaceted and somewhat complicated nature of 
lawfare through the examination of the concept itself along with the analysis of the dialogue 
between the US and CAT Committee. This nuance is highly entrenched in the Bush 
administration’s infamous claim that Geneva Conventions and CAT did not apply to detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay. International legal instruments such as the CAT and Geneva Conventions are 
used by international organizations such as the UN and serve to constrain state behavior (in this 
case, anti-torture practices) through agreed-upon principles and guidelines. However, with the 
Bush administration’s claim of inapplicability, this function of international law was challenged. 
Added to this, although this thesis focuses on the double usage of lawfare i.e. anti-war and pro-
war, from an examination of the concept, even these usages are multifaceted. For instance, 
through the determination that the Geneva Conventions did not apply, the Bush administration 
also sought protection for CIA officials. Sikkink (2013) argues that by doing this, officials would 
have been protected from domestic prosecution for interrogation practices. Here, we see that 
while the US had tenets of international law (Geneva Conventions and CAT) enshrined in their 
domestic legislation, they rendered these same international instruments inapplicable with the 
argument that detainees were illegal enemy combatants. Therefore, the Bush administration 
engaged in lawfare (through a denial of international law), not only because of what Luban 
(2008) and Jones (2016) argue was a reaction to criticism by lawyers and NGOs, but to protect 
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officials from prosecution (under the same international laws which they committed to and 
denied). Furthermore, while some of the literature used in this thesis does not explicitly mention 
lawfare, much of it discusses the very tenets of the concept. This somewhat speaks to how 
multifaceted lawfare as a concept is and how it can be used to examine various actions through 
an anti-war or pro-war lens.  
      The analysis of reports confirms scholars’ arguments that the Bush administration did indeed 
engage in lawfare. They reveal the complicated nature of this concept evidenced by the different 
ways in which the Bush administration manipulated international law i.e. the CAT and Geneva 
Conventions. It can be said that through ‘pro-war’ lawfare, the Bush administration blatantly 
denied international instruments. Along with this blatant denial came the creation of the legal 
category, the ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ that the Bush administration used to justify the 
inapplicability of international instruments and thus the commission of torture. Furthermore, the 
reports reveal that the Obama administration did not engage in lawfare, but rather took an 
“anything but Bush stance” which sought to repair the ‘pro-war’ harms done by the Bush 
administration. However, the CAT Committee still raised concerns over some of the Obama 
administration’s inactions regarding thorough investigations and interrogation practices which 
left room for torture.   
 
V. Conclusion 
      This thesis began by providing a contextual basis for the examination of the obligations 
which the US has to international law. As a ratified state of the CAT and through including 
elements of the Geneva Conventions in its domestic law, it has expressed its commitment to the 
prohibition of torture. The concept of lawfare was then examined to serve as a theoretical 
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framework for the discussion of the complex relationship that exists between law, domestic and 
international, and state practices that fall under the heading of warfare. As seen in the literature, 
lawfare can have a double usage i.e. anti-war and pro-war. Many scholars such as Jones (2016) 
and Luban (2008) contend that the Bush administration’s engagement in ‘pro-war’ lawfare was 
as a result of the anti-war lawfare waged against it by lawyers and NGOs in response to practices 
at Guantanamo Bay. Through an analysis of six reports between the CAT Committee and the 
US, linkages to the concept of lawfare were seen, mainly through the Bush administration’s 
determination that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Guantanamo Bay detainees. 
Scholars such as Megret (2006) remind us that this ‘pro-war’ lawfare can be read through the 
very colonial nature of international instruments which have historically excluded the ‘other’ 
from the laws of war. Through the analysis of the dialogue between the CAT Committee and 
both administrations, the argument that the Bush administration engaged in lawfare was 
examined through the Committee’s assertions and responses to the reports. This dialogue was 
broken down into the issues surrounding the application of the CAT and Geneva Conventions at 
all times, the judicial process, the use of military commissions and interrogation techniques. 
These issues also confirm many scholars’ arguments as to how the Bush administration deployed 
lawfare.  
      Bush, through his post/911 policies generated numerous concerns voiced by the CAT 
Committee and other actors in the international community. Meanwhile, Obama’s executive 
orders, which included the order to close Guantanamo Bay, did not distract the CAT Committee 
and scholars from his continuation of Bush’s policies. To this date, it is clear that there is still a 
lack of thorough investigations into the abuse that occurred at Guantanamo Bay and blame must 
be put on both administrations in the failure to uphold their obligations to the CAT and Geneva 
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Conventions. Remnants of Bush’s use of lawfare were carried over into the Obama era and the 
presence of Guantanamo Bay remains as a stark reminder of this. Along with this use of lawfare 
lies an interesting dynamic between the US and its obligations to the UN. On the one hand, the 
US has shown its commitment to human rights regarding the prohibition of torture by ratifying 
the CAT and consistently reporting during the Bush and Obama eras (as seen by availability of 
these reports to the researcher and the ability to use them in this essay). However, on the other 
hand, while attempting to uphold these obligations through regular reporting, one can see the US 
engaging in lawfare through a blatant disregard for the CAT when it comes to Guantanamo Bay. 
This interesting dynamic also reveals the nuance present in the way in which international legal 
instruments i.e. the CAT and Geneva Conventions were manipulated by the Bush administration.  
In a time where the battlefield has been transcended to offshore facilities, efforts to be in a ‘state 
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